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ABSTRACT
The paper continues previous course work in examining a
development project in Boston called. the Boston Army Base. The
project was developed by Boston's Economic Development and
Industrial Corporation in an attempt to aid distressed garment
firms in the city's Chinatown area, and purportedly to save the
jobs of many residents of the Chinatown community. The paper
evaluates the development throuqh a community planning
perspective, in order to illustrate certain lessons for all
community planners in the future.
The paper describes and criticizes the roles and actions by
those involved in the development: the Economic Development
and Industrial Corporation; the Urban Development Action Grant
program; the city administration; and. the community of
Chinatown. The work concludes that the project did not benefit
the Chinatown community and therefore from a community planning
perspective should have been opposed.
As a result of the analysis, the paper draws four lessons to be
heeded by those interested in planning for communities: 1) be
skeptically critical and untrusting of public agencies and
proposed developments, examine their data and assumptions; be
clear of the ramifications of development; 2) do not be rushed
or pushed into development in order to take advantaqe of
available public funds, determine how and who it will help; 3)
demand participation and control in publically financed or
supported development in neighborhoods; and 4) as an organizing
strategy oppose developments and programs that do not meet the
needs of the communities.
Thesis Supervisor: Frank Jones, M.B.A.
Title: Professor of Urban Affairs
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION 4
TI. INITIAL PERCEPTIONS 5
III. UPDATE/REVIEW
1. Review of Site Selection Process 8
2. Delays in Purchase of the Site 9
3. Late Delivery of the Project 11
4. EDTC Looks For Tenants 13
IV. THE UDAG COMPONENT
1. Brief History and Chronology of a UDAG 14
2. EDIC's UDAG Application 15
3. UDAG Agreement for BAB Project 17
4. HUD Area Office 18
5. Close Out and Best Efforts 20
V. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS
A. EDIC 22
B. UDAG 25
C. Community Growth and Development 27
VI. LESSONS FOR COMMUNITY PLANNERS 30
VII. FOOTNOTES
TABLE I
BIBLIOGRAPHY/SOURCES
APPENDICES
-3-
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper was written in part as a continuation of a case
study written for a course entitled. "Financing Community
Economic Development". The first case study, called the Boston
Army Base Final Report, is attached and is prerequisite reading
for this endeavor. (See Appendix I) That paper, written in
May 1983, explained the complex financing scheme of the project
but raised unanswered questions and certain substantive issues
about the development project. Some of the previous questions
will be answered as the reader is brought up to date on the
events of the development, but new issues and questions will be
raised by viewing the development in a different light.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Boston Army
Base project through a community planner's perspective. The
paper asserts that a community planner, conducting a critical
review of the project, would conclude that the Chinatown
community was a "loser" in this project, and that Chinatown was
misused by city and federal agencies and programs. In
comparison to the initial expectations of the project held by
the community and this author, the final development product
was far from that which was promised by the project "hype". By
examining the events, processes and forces at plav in this
case, we can see lessons for all community planners and
leaders, if we are to avoid such planning and development
problems in the future.
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The Boston Army Base (BAB) project was proposed and.
presented by the city to Chinatown and the public as the
development that would save Boston's garment industry, thus
saving a major economic base of the community and promoting
community economic development for Chinatown. In order to save
the qarment industry, the development was supposed to relocate
Chinatown qarment companies by constructing a "garment center"
at the Boston Army Base site. Questions will be raised as to
whether the project truly had the capability or intended to
help Chinatown or promote community economic development in
Chinatown. What is clear from what happened is that the
project failed to create the garment center envisioned by the
developer, the Economic Development and Industrial Corporation
(EDIC).
After presenting the community's initial perceptions of
the project and describing the basis for these beliefs, the
paper will relate, based on what is known at this time, the
events of the development. The actions, roles and effects of
the city, EDIC, and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) grants in the project are discussed and
analyzed. Changes and growth within the community resulting
from this project are explored. An analysis of the lessons
that can be learned by communities from this case is presented.
II. INITIAL PERCEPTIONS
Chinatown community groups were originally sold on the
idea of the Garment Center based on the premise that it would
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save 1,500 jobs for Chinatown. At meetings attended by the BRA
and EDIC at Senator Tsongas' office, one community leader has
said that the project was represented as community economic
development for Chinatown. Indeed, it was the promise of
saving and creating jobs for Chinatown that won their support.
In a public campaign to pressure the General Services
Administration (GSA) to reduce their price for the site
(described in Chapter II), the benefit to Chinatown from the
project was repeatedly used as a rationale for the project.2
It was purported (by the city) and believed (by the community)
that the project was being done to aid Chinatown and its
residents. Perhaps EDIC believed this too, victims of their
own publicity campaign. Duplicitous or not, misinformation did
occur.
Indeed, there was also an initial perception (by this
author and others) that the application for Urban Development
Action Grant (UDAG) funds required a target population group
and in this case that the group was Chinatown residents.
Because the public "speak" inferred many times that this
project was essential to save Chinatown jobs, it appeared to
the inexperienced outsider and to the community that the
project was directed at the people who held these jobs. There
was a commonly held belief that the UDAG application was made
on behalf of Chinese workers, a distressed. minority group. But
a distressed group of people is not the direct target of UDAG
awards, it is jobs and industry.
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Both the UDAG and this project obviously presumed an
indirect benefit to the Chinese workers, but conveniently
limited their obliqation by stating the jobs goals of the UDAG
in generic terms. It appears that even now community groups
are unaware that the UDAG application and Agreement were worded
to exclude any obligation to them.3
The Boston Army Base development is now called the
Bronstein Industrial Center, and has been attached to another
city project, the Boston Marine Industrial Park (BMTP). The
Center, developed by the Economic Development Industrial
Corporation (EDIC), was financed by a combination of UDAG,
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and syndication
funds, industrial revenue bonds, loans and local bank loan
guarantees. June 1986 employment statistics show that of 824
employees there, only 56 are Black (7%), 24 are Hispanic (3%)
and 83 are Other Minorities (10%). (See Table I for
description of firms and employees.) These number are a far
cry from the 1,500 jobs (for mostly Chinese workers) that were
originally supposed to be relocated there from 15 and 35
Kneeland Street. Currently, the Center is fully leased and
houses thirty-one firms employing 845 workers. How the devel-
opment came to fruition and the roles of its participants -
EDIC, the city administration, HUD's UDAG program and others is
detailed below.
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III. UPDATE/REVIEW
Review of Site Selection Process
EDIC did a survey in the spring of 1981 that tabulated the
space cost and eviction needs of garment/apparel companies. Of
the 47 responding companies, 77% faced eviction or exhorbitant
rent increases within one year. These companies employed 2,356
people, 58% of whom were Boston residents and 47% were of
Oriental descent. The respondents expressed overwhelming
support for the idea of a garment center (75%) and about one
third desired or approved of the Boston Marine Industrial Park
and Boston Army Base for the location. Based on the survey
results, approximately 400,000 square feet (sq. ft.) was needed
to relocate the companies enmasse to a "garment center".4
Eighteen locations and garment center scenarios were
analyzed by the members of GIRA (Garment Industrv Relocation
Association) and their consultant. However, in many of the
alternatives examined the rents would have been too expensive
(companies could or would not pay over 2.50/sq.ft.) or the
space inadequate to accomodate keeping all of the garment firms
together. Location was also a prime consideration. In
addition, to keep the firms in Boston, which was the purpose of
creating a garment center, the rents had to be competitive with
locations outside of Boston.5
The Boston Army Base (and the BMTP area) was offered as a
possible site partially because EDIC already had an interest in
purchasing it.6 EDIC had analyzed the possible uses of the
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Army Base and concluded that it was not viable for office,
retail, residential, or research use. The lack of alternatives
for its use, its large amount of space, its location (and the
fact it is adjacent to EDIC's successfully developed BMIP) made
it ideal for conversion to industrial use. The proximity of
the Base to downtown Boston and Chinatown, the (satisfactory)
initial rental calculations and the large space available were
all factors in its emergence as one of the best locations for
the Garment Center (e.g. vote, consensus or default). The
exact date or decision process by which the Boston Army Base
was chosen is unclear (to this observer) . What is known is
that by late 1981 Building 114 of the Boston Army Base was the
building to be purchased and renovated into the garment center.
Delays in Purchase of the Site
When EDIC began negotiations to purchase BAB from the
General Services Administration (GSA) , it had known for some
time that the property was due to be declared "surplus" (for
sale) but the price had thus far been unknown. From meetings
with GSA regional officials, EDIC had expected the GSA to
declare the BAB surplus and have it appraised by February 1982.
The GSA, for unknown reasons, did not complete their process
until four months later. Their initial asking price was an
unexpected 4.1 million dollars. EDIC had anticipated an
acquisition cost of no more than 2 million dollars, based on
their own independent appraisal. Protracted price negotiations
ensued, causing even further delay. Much of EDIC's planning
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for the project thus far had hinged on the lower estimate. The
higher purchase price and the further delays it caused put the
development at risk.
To make the project viable for the garment firms, low
acquisition and renovation costs were essential, or rental
prices would be too expensive, contrary to a "haven" for the
garment industry. As EDIC was negotiating with the GSA, the
clock was ticking for tenants at 15 and 35 Kneeland Street, who
were facing looming eviction proceedings. EDIC had hoped to
move the firms into the Army Base in the summer of 1982, under
an interim agreement based on it's intent to purchase the site.
The GSA's late appraisal and subsequent price negotiations
delayed any purchase agreement and prevented an interim lease.
EDIC and the BRA were able to obtain extensions for the firms
from their evictors, Tufts New England Medical Center, (TNEMC)
until January 1983.
The delavs and eviction deadlines also threatened the UDAG
component of EDIC's Boston Army Base project. Receiving a UDAG
loan or grant was contingent upon saving the garment industry
jobs. Although the UDAG application was preliminarily approved
in September 1982, if EDIC could not secure the site before the
firms were evicted and had moved elsewhere, there would be no
rationale for receiving UDAG funds. Also, the UDAG award was a
crucial component of the development, representing almost 4
million dollars of the total financing.
When the negotiations with the GSA dragged on, the city
began to conduct an intensive publicity campaign in order to
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pressure the GSA to expedite the process and reduce the
purchase price. The Garment Industry Relocation Association
(GIRA), EDIC, then Mayor White, Senators Kennedy and Tsongas,
Representative Moakley, the local chapter of the ILGWU, and two
Chinatown community groups all wrote letters of support of the
project to the GSA. A top Reagan Administration official,
Edwin Messe, was contacted to ensure smooth passage of the sale
through congressional committees once the price was settled.
Editorials were written in local newspapers calling for the GSA
to act quickly and fairly. The project was represented by
many as vital to Chinatown, in that these garment industry jobs
were a major part of that neighborhood's economv.
The City's strategy of public pressure proved successful.
The price (3.5 million) and a workable purchase agreement were
finally reached by late 1982. The UDAG loan (3.7 million) was
awarded in December 1982 and in July 1983 the final UDAG
Agreement was executed, requiring the BAB project to create 139
new permanent jobs and retail 750 existing jobs. However, the
threatened garment firms were further delayed from moving into
the Base. An engineering study commissioned by EDIC showed
that substantial renovations were necessary before the building
could meet building and safety codes. EDIC negotiated an
additional extension for the firms from January 1983 until June
1983.
Late Delivery of the Project
The late deliverv of the project caused great concern
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among the garment firm owners. Regardless of their extension
until June, the firms had become uneasy, and many lost
confidence in the project. In support of the UDAG application
26 firms had signed letters of intent or prelease committments.
These letters included their own plans for capital improvement
(investment) in the space to be leased, a requirement of a UDAG
award. Unconvinced the site would be ready by June or whenever
they would be evicted, most firms moved elsewhere. Twelve
firms moved near the BAB, to the Fargo building, which also had
lower rents. Some moved to other Boston locations, while
others moved out of the city, those jobs probably lost to the
city forever. It appears that a final account of where all of
the firms have moved was not kept. Only two of the originally
twenty-eight threatened firms actually moved into the BAB.
Before opening the Garment Center had been 70% preleased, but
by the time construction and rehabilitation were finished it
was only 10% leased.
Although only two of the original 28 firms moved into the
BAB, EDIC asserts that the project elevated the esteem for the
garment industry with Boston's commercial landlords, thus in a
way helping to keep them in Boston (and saving jobs). Prior to
the project, most garment companies were considered risky
tenants and consequently charged premium rents if they could
get a lease at all.8 While this may have been an unexpected
benefit, it does not address the failure of the project to save
the garment industry in a protected "haven". Market shifts
could. cause similar problems later on, forcing the firms to
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then move out of Boston, still taking those precious jobs with
them.
EDIC Looks For Tenants
EDIC's mandate is to promote industry city-wide and to
assist all of Boston's companies, from start up through
expansion. In Fall 1983, EDIC began actively searching for
tenants for BAB, engaging the Codman Company as their exclusive
marketing and leasing agents. Because of EDIC's other economic
development activities, it was known that printing firms could
benefit from the new industrial center. Some Boston printing
firms were facing rent increases that threatened their
survival, while others were seeking to expand but could not
find suitable affordable space within the city. To date, 10
printing firms have moved into the BAB. The BAB UDAG Agreement
does not limit tenancy at the site to the garment industry, and
EDIC has sought to use the Center to help save and create jobs
in other industrial sector's of Boston economy.9
The leasing, however, happened slowly and by September
1984 only 40% of the space was rented. September 1984 was the
initial deadline for creating the 139 jobs called for in the
UDAG Agreement. The deadline was not met, and an amendment to
the Agreement had to be requested by the city. The
consequences of unfulfilled UDAG agreements as well as other
aspects of the UDAG and HUD's roles in development projects are
examined below.
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TV. THE UDAG COMPONENT
Brief History and Chronology of a UDAG
The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) was introduced.
in 1978 as part of the Carter Administration's Housing and
Community Development Act. It emphasizes a "partnership
approach" between federal, state and local governments and the
private business sector. Since its inception, over 5 billion
dollars in UDAG money has been awarded. through fiscal year
1985. Boston has received over twenty awards (for comparison,
New York City and Baltimore have received over fifty awards) .10
A primary selection criteria for awards is designation as a
"distressed" city, based on census and labor statistics (i.e.
per capita income, age of housing, job and population
lag/decline within a city, unemployment). Cities with "pockets
of poverty" experiencing similar problems may also apply for
funds for those specific neighborhoods. Other criteria require
the leveraging of private investment capital to UDAG funes
(2.5:1 or greater is desirable); creation of new permanent jobs
(cost of $5,000.00 or less is desirable); retention of jobs for
low to moderate income persons, committment to minority
participation; and tax benefits. 1 1
Preliminary approval of an application for a UDAG is made
to the Central Office of HUD in Washington, in part based on
reviews and recommendations made by appropriate field office
divisions. Federal regulations and guidelines require:
demonstration that the Grant is causing the private development
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to occur; a proven private investment to develop that depends
upon a UDAG award; firm financing for the project, including
necessary equity, if any; a committment for any other public
funds needed for the project; a plan for how the land will be
controlled or owned; and evidence that the grant will not cause
relocation from one distressed area to another. 12
Once the UDAG has been preliminarily approved, a Grant
Agreement (a legal contract) is made in Washington between HUD
and the City Recipient. The funded project is supposed to
begin with six to twelve months of the award, and be completed
within twenty-four months of preliminary approval. During the
life of the project, the use of UDAG funds is monitored by
field staff from the HUD area office. The final stages of a
UDAG award is the "close out" agreement and completion
certificate. When and if the field office is satisfied that
the project has been completed as best as possible, it will
recommend "closed out" status for the project, excepting any
further loan repayments. If approved by the regional office
and the UDAG office in Washington, a completion certificate is
issued when all financial obligations are discharged.
EDIC's UDAG Application
EDIC's UDAG Application for the BAB project was prelimi-
narily approved on September 30, 1982. The application was
introduced by a letter from then Mayor Kevin White, stating
that 1,500 jobs would be saved and 300 new jobs created by the
development. A supporting letter from Senator Kennedy stressed
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the importance of retaining these jobs, referring to the fact
that many of the jobs were held by minorities, and that
sianificant unemployment would result should the project not
occur. Throughout the application reference is made to
Chinatown as both the geographic location of Boston's garment
industry and as a community facing the loss of one of its major
employers. The application described Boston's garment industry
- its recent up and down ward trends, its future viability, and
the percentage of minority and low income workers employed in
the city's garment industry.13
While the application was not made specifically on behalf
of the employees of Boston's garment firms, the impact of the
loss of the garment industry to the people it employs was
clearly the concern that prompted the application and the
rationale for funding it. Testimony from the local chapter of
the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union was submitted
in support of the project, indicating how dependent the Chinese
workers were on these jobs. The premise of the application was
clearly that relocating the qarment firms from Chinatown to the
BAB would mean saving these specific individuals' jobs by
relocating them to another site. The Boston City Council tried
to insure this by authorizing a provision in the UDAG and
Section 108 (CDBG) applications that gave primary consideration
for any new lobs at the BAB development to residents of the
Chinatown/South Cove, South Boston, and North End neighbor-
hoods. This type of provision is forbidden under federal equal
opportunity laws (it would be discriminatory because these
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neighborhoods have no identifiable Black and Hispanic
populations). 4 HUD required that the illegal language be
removed from the applications. 1 5
UDAG Agreement for BAB Project
The language in the Agreement did not bind the project to
Chinatown, Chinatown garment firms or workers, or to the
garment industry at all. The Agreement specified only that the
City, through the BAB development project, was obligated to
create 139 permanent jobs and to retain 750 existing jobs. Of
the 139 new jobs, 125 (90%) were to be for low to moderate
income workers and 35 (20%) were to be for minority workers. 1 6
The initially higher numbers of job creation and retention (300
created, 1,500 retained) were later adjusted downward by EDIC
and HUD respectively. EDIC was forced to reduce its estimate
of jobs to be created when many of the garment firms began to
withdraw their preleasing committments to the Garment Center.
HUD staff reduced EDIC's estimate of 1,500 retained jobs,
presumably for the same reason, as well as to take a minimum
and more experienced stand to job estimates.17
Pursuant to the BAB UDAG Agreement, the jobs requirement
of the project was to be completed twenty-four months from
preliminary approval (September 1984). The reviews and audits
routinely performed by HUD area office staff showed that the
job goals were not on schedule. The HUD area office plays a
crucial role in recommending and monitoring projects which
requires explanation and discussion here.
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HUD Area Office
Each application for a UDAG award is reviewed by the HUD
area office of Community Planning and Development, the office
of Equal Opportunity and Fair Housing, and the Employment and
Market Analysis Division. Recommendations and reviews are
forwarded to the HUD Washington UDAG office. From examination
of certain HUD BAB documents, it is this author's opinion that
some reviews are treated in a seemingly facile manner. In the
Employment and Market Analysis Review, there appeared to be no
evidence of independent research or confirmation of employment
and market statistics and assumptions utilized by EDIC in the
application. The check list form issued by HUD to assure equal
opportunity seems to perfunctorily accept the claims in the
UDAG application. Again, there seems to be no critical
analysis of the claims that minority groups would be adversely
effected by the lack of said development, and will positively
benefit from developing the project. One exhibit of the
application, a demographic profile of the Chinatown/South Cove
area does not cite its source.18 This is not to suggest that
the Boston HUD area office staff is or was in any way
deficient. They followed procedures established through
Federal regulations and policies that apparently do not require
the in-depth analysis the general public might expect for such
large public expenditures.
The HUD office in Washington is where the decision is made
whether or not to fund a UDAG project. Beside the area office
reviews, there are many other factors (including political
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pressure) involved in each decision that are not discussed
here. After a grant is awarded, responsibility for the project
is sent back to the area office for monitoring. The transfer
of control (and large numbers of documents) back and forth can
be cumbersome. Disparity and disagreement can occur, as is the
case within many large organizations and corporations, but the
area office is bound by the Agreement or any other decisions
made in Washington.
Follow-up and monitoring is accomplished through audits of
the projects and periodic reports submitted by the Recipient.
In the case of the Boston Army Base, these audits revealed the
lack of job creation and retention of the project. 9 The
initial audit was performed directly after the above specified
twenty-four months. By September 1984, the Center was only 40%
leased. The HUD area office recommended that the City apply
for an amendment to the Agreement to extend the deadline for
providing the lobs to forty-eight months. There were
mitigating factors that supported this amendment. There was no
time limit stated by EDIC in the UDAG application. The
twenty-four month restriction was apparently inserted in the
agreement by staff in the central UDAG office. As a general
rule, twenty-four months is allowed for completion of a project
but more time can be allowed for exceptions. In addition,
there was a fault in the original agreement because in that the
construction of tenant improvements was not due to be completed
until December 1984. Therefore, September 1984 was an
unrealistic deadline for completing jobs goals if companies
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were not expected to operate at full capacity until two months
later. This discrepancy can be attributed to the inconsistency
that can occur between the central and area offices. 20 The
request for the amendment was approved, allowing EDIC until
September 1986 to complete the project (produce jobs).
The audits also showed ineffective or insufficient data
collection by the city on the number of new jobs created, and
inappropriate definitions of minority status. The city's NDEA
(Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency) served as the
city's job monitor for this project. At one point, personnel
there had mistakenly counted persons of Portuguese descent as
minorities. Questions and. problems also arose about how to
define a new job (what baseline dates and numbers to use) and
whether rehiring laid off employees constituted creating new
jobs (from HUD's view, it does not.)2 1
Close Out and Best Efforts
According to Boston HUD staff subsequent audits, found
improvement in reporting methods and satisfactory numbers of
jobs created and retained by the BAB development. Evaluation
of completion of job goals is based on a "best efforts"
criteria: have the developers made earnest and reasonable
efforts to accomplish the goals; and was there good faith on
the part of the developers in proposing their estimates. If
the HUD staff finds that a developer/recipient does not meet
those criteria, the project is considered in default, any
funding yet to be dispersed is denied, and/or HUD can require
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immediate repayment of monev already spent from the Award. If
it is deemed that best efforts have been made, the project is
declared "closed out". 2
The Community Planning Division staff (responsible for
close out review) did auestion the lack of garment firms at the
site and did some independent research to find out why. They
found that many of the firms would or could not wait for the
Garment Center to be ready, or found cheaper rents elsewhere
(less than the $2.75/sq. ft. EDIC offered at BAB) . The late
delivery of project, the slightly higher than promised rents
and the fact that firms chose other alternatives were all
viewed as out of EDIC's control. Also, HUD looked favorably
upon EDIC's attempt to assist the printing firms. HUD
determined that EDIC (and the BAB project) did put forth their
best efforts at completing the job goals.
The Boston Army Base project was officially given close
out status in the Fall 1986. At the time close out was
recommended in the Summer of 1986, only 78 new jobs had been
created, a little more than half of the number of jobs that was
supposed to be created by the UDAG award through the project.
The total workforce at the Center was almost 800 at that time,
the other 722 jobs are presumably the retained jobs. Within
the current workforce of 845 employees, no more than 275 are
jobs within garment or apparel companies.
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V. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS
A. EDIC
It is the author's opinion that EDIC wanted to develop the
Boston Army Base and would probably have done so with or
without the Garment Center Project. EDIC may not be a city
agency, but it has a deep and strong connection to City Hall
and city politics. The very creation of an agency such as EDIC
is an expression and tool of a city administration's public
policy on economic development. In one public announcement the
BAB and BMIP are hailed as the next "Quincy Market" of
industrial parks. The strong support, extensive "string
pulling" and lobbying by the city can be interpreted as
determination on the part of city to develop the BAB area. The
previous case suggested that EDIC and the city wanted to
purchase the site for the other development activities (e.g.
Navy Base). The industrial has spurred other development in
the area. A Design Center has opened in another part of the
Base, and is rapidly becoming nationally acclaimed. While the
Boston Army Base project was not community development for
Chinatown, this type of economic development certainly helps
the city's economy.
As a developer, though, EDIC turned in a poor performance
in the BAB development, Pre-committment letters from GIRA
members were not binding, and were a poor basis for developing
some 400,000 square feet. Also, EDIC was unprepared for the
purchase process the GSA, and problems in this process should
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have been more intricately examined in their site availability
analysis. A possibly higher purchase price should have been
better planned for, instead it put the whole development at
risk.
EDIC does not appear to have kept track of how many of the
original Chinatown garment firm jobs it had intended to save
were actually saved. HUD did not require EDIC to do so, nor
did the community request of them to give such an accounting.
That no such accounting or obligation is required or demanded
seems unfair and unfortunate since the application was really
made based on the plight of these garment workers losing their
jobs.
The project and EDIC are not accountable for the nature or
results of the development to the community, the citizens of
the city or of the country for that matter. They are only
loosely obligated to HUD to create some jobs and to induce
economic activity. This is a serious flaw in the public
planning process. While as a quasi-public agency EDIC is
subject to public scrutiny and pressure, the groups it claims
to represent are really owed more. When EDIC, acting on behalf
of the city (and its citizens) prepares and submits an
application for federal money, they assume and accept a public
trust for the city. They have a responsibility to inform the
communities effected of changes in developments they are
supported to take part in, and to give a satisfactory
explanations of said changes.
Moreover, from a community planning perspective, EDIC, as
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a representative of the city, had a responsibility to involve
and include community groups to a far greater extent than they
did in the BAB development. Acting much like a private
developer, they concerned themselves mostly with the process of
building the project, getting caught up in financing and
construction deadlines. Because of their independent status
and the nature of their development activities, EDIC is not
required to include any more than surface community
participation, mostly in the form of public hearings.
In the Boston Army Base project, community leaders could
participate by joining GIRA, but the focus of this organization
was on the garment companies of Chinatown, not its people. It
was at these public hearings and meetings that the few
community leaders that were involved were (mis) led by rhetoric
and professional jargon to understand that this project was
community economic development for Chinatown. In future
planning projects, the local groups involved in development
projects such as these should strive to obtain definitive
agreements with developing agencies, in order to insure full
participation in and accountability of projects.
EDIC is not the body to do community economic development
within the city of Boston, although they appear to do so and
this is misleading. Their mandate is to retain and create jobs
for Boston's residents (from any community) , improving the
economic base of the whole city, not specifically to improve
the economic base of a particular community. They do their
projects, though, by advertising how much they help communities
-24-
by saving its residents' jobs. In this case, there was a
somewhat illogical assertion, inferred by EDIC, and accepted by
the community and public, that community economic development
would be accomplished by moving the garment industry out of
Chinatown.
No long term planning relationship existed between EDIC
and Chinatown. EDIC staff had been in close contact with
business owners in the community but showed no understanding of
what the community as a whole needed or wanted. If they had
been a community planning agency, they would have looked at the
problem through the eves of Chinatown residents, questioning
the quality of garment industry jobs (i.e. wages/benefits,
working conditions, advancement) and explored the future
employment and training needs of Chinatown residents.
B. UDAG
UDAG, as an expression of federal public policy, favors
place and physical development over people development. By
spurring economic growth, the UDAG program assumes that more
jobs and housing will create a better quality of life for
people. This relies heavily on a "domino" theory of economics
- more business growth will eventually help to alleviate
poverty. The UDAG agreement does commit the project to giving
job preference to low and moderate income people. This may
imply a hidden assumption (and flaw) - that distinctively
disadvantaged groups are interchangeable in this type of
economic development project. The nature of the iobs to be
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created or retained by UDAG awards must be reconsidered by
Federal policy makers. This UDAG seemed only to consider the
quantity, not the quality, of the garment industry jobs. For
the some $26,000/job that was to be spent to create 139 jobs,
one might consider the alternative uses for such a large sum of
money (e.g. retraining).
If the federal government is counting on UDAG to help
create more jobs, it must discontinue funding projects such as
the BAB where only 56% of the new jobs goals is met. EDIC and
the BAB project may have met HUD's "best efforts" criteria, but
one must ask if 3.7 million dollars of public money is too much
money to be judged against a best efforts criteria. The BAB
development initially had a ratio of over $26,000 UDAG dollars
per job created. These ratios are considered by HUD when
applications are approved or denied, so cost/benefit ratios are
an accepted tool to use in arguing for or against a project.
When the promised number of jobs is not created, the ratio can
be much higher than predicted. The final BAB project ratio was
over $47,000 UDAG dollars per job. Extremely high ratios such
as this one could indicate that certain kinds of projects being
funded by UDAG are inefficient in achieving their goals.
When allowing a best efforts criteria, federal policy may
be trying to be flexible, but it's a too haphazard treatment of
millions of dollars, and vulnerable to abuse. HUD should
consider enforcing specific performance of the Agreement
contract, or devise repayment plans that compensate (to
taxpayers) for each job or housing unit not produced as
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promised. HUD should be sure to avoid funding some types of
projects that have shown a pattern or history of risky delays
or unrealistic jobs goals.
The best efforts criteria, the sometimes cursory review of
applications, the lack of contact with the community and the
limited community participation are indications that the UDAG
program is merely a funnel for federal dollars, not a planning
program. Unless and until the program changes, they will offer
the money, but it is up to cities (and their planners) to learn
from these mistakes and turn down tempting money for these
projects. Poor performance on past UDAG grants can limit or
eliminate a city from future consideration for UDAG funds. To
avoid jeopardizing other programs, community groups should
lobby against UDAG funding for projects than can seem to
address their problems but really do not.
C. Community Growth and Development
The problems of the Chinatown garment workers focused
community leaders on its economic and employment problems, the
need to have more control over the land in their neighborhood,
and the need to make Tufts and the city more responsive to the
community's needs. In many ways, the BAB project was a
catalyst for change and growth within the community. Prior to
this "crisis" there was little communication or coordination
between the major community organizations. The Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) was viewed as the
old school but most powerful of the groups. The Chinatown
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Housing and Land Task Force was seen as the young radicals.
The Chinatown Community Economic Development Corporation
(CCEDC) was thought of as an organization with internal
problems, and had primarily been involved in housing
development. 2 4  These diverse groups came together, united, to
confront Tufts New England Medical Center, and they were
successful, fostering new found confidence in their ability to
shape their community.
The previous case study described the encroachment of
TNMEC on Chinatown. Chinatown groups had, for a long time,
felt powerless against Tufts, and felt they would not receive
help from the City in this matter. Each of the community
groups described above had begun to realize the desperate need
for education and training, and Tufts' poor record in hiring
community residents. However, the Task Force and the CCEDC
were hesitant to approach Tufts without the power of the
traditional leadership of the CCBA. Negotiations between
leaders of the community groups took place, and members of
these younger community groups gained leadership positions in a
new body, created to represent the community in dealings with
Tufts. They requested and received a $100,000 grant from TNMEC
for a training program, along with a committment from Tufts for
placement of the program's first graduates. The training
program has graduated. 120 people in the past two years from a
medical office skills training program. The Chinatown
Occupational Training Center and Bay State Skills Bureau
operate the program.25
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An additional victory was felt when a zoning amendment
that was co-sponsored by the CCBA and the BRA was approved by
the city council in December 1981. The amendment restricts the
development and expansion of medical institution within the
city and subjects all such plans to review by neighborhoods and
the BRA. An institutional review board was later created to
review proposed expansions and advise the Mayor on related
.s 26issues.
Chinatown and its residents have successively and success-
fully gained more power - they are being heard and are
achieving some of their objectives. The confidence and
recognition created by the negotiations with Tufts as well as
the garment center project has spurred other garment workers to
demand retraining from government agencies. P&L Sportswear
employees were laid off without notice after that Chinatown
company went out of business suddenly in December 1985. The
workers, over 300 strong, about 200 Chinese, demanded that the
state release funds for their retraining. They compared their
status with that of the Colonial Meat Company employees, who
received assistance within two weeks of that plant closing. At
the time of their organizing rally, the P&L workers had gone
four months without state assistance. They organized, got
publicity on their own, and succeeded in their demands.
Other community groups, including the Chinese Progressive
Association, the Asian American Resource Workshop and the
Workers Committee, are in the process of documenting garment
jobs - not only the working conditions but the future viability
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of lobs in this industry as well. Additional projects seek to
assess the direction the community should take in community
economic development projects, looking at improving jobs in the
service sector (another large employer of Chinatown residents)
and seeking other employment alternatives. The community has
learned from the failure of the Garment Center to save garment
industry jobs. The residents now want retraining for better
more modern and secure jobs.
Previously ignored by the city and essentially politically
powerless, the community has begun to become organized, new
leadership is slowly emerging, and the residents are looking
for new ways to help themselves. While there truly was no
community economic development for Chinatown from the Boston
Army Base Development, "community development" did result from
it.
VI. LESSONS FOR COMMUNITY PLANNERS
At the time of the BAB project the Chinatown community
lacked the experienced to play a key role, and this lack of
experience may have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the
project. Had community groups been more experienced, they may
have argued with EDIC and the city that this was not a viable
or reliable project.
Community groups saw the BAB development as the "best"
solution because it was the only solution really put forth by
the city. They felt they had no choice but to support the
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project with the "hope" it would help.27 Nonetheless, a good
many people in the community expressed reservations about the
project. They were concerned about racial and language
barriers that they feared would arise from the move to South
Boston, a community historically known as racist and viewed
dangerous to travel within. Also, most of the workers walked
to work in Chinatown for years, some had never ridden a bus
before. There was concern that the workers would not follow
their jobs to the Army Base in South Boston.2 8
Reservations of this kind should immediately serve as
"flags" that a program or project may not be responsive to a
community's needs. if community residents are uncomfortable or
unclear about a development they should be cautious of its
intentions. While this may seem obvious, often times
communities make the mistake of being too trusting of public
agencies. As communities, we must not accept, prima facie,
that the city, state or federal agencies will "do the right
thing" for us or know what is best for us. In this case, the
Chinatown community accepted the project on face value,
believing that EDIC and the city were doing the project for the
good of their community and that this kind of development was
what Chinatown needed.
Looking at what happened (or failed to happen), we can see
that communities need to be skeptically critical of fast
moving, highly touted developments. We must ask questions,
examine the data and the rationales used for projects,
especially when millions of dollars are being sought based on
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assumptions about us. To do this, we must be prepared. For
example, no one from Chinatown read the BAB JDAG application or
Agreement. This was likely due to the community's inexperience
and lack of knowledqe about the processes of this kind of
development. Chinatown and communities in similar situations
should seek technical assistance (an important role for
planners) if they do not yet have the capability to complete
analyses on their own.
It is important for all communities to realize that we
must allow ourselves to be pushed or rushed (into development)
by external forces or factors, no matter how formidable they
seem. Being pressured can be a signal that we should pull
back, not go forward. In the case of Chinatown, the city and
EDIC stressed the urgency of developing BAB, conducting an
intensive publicity campaign and enlisting the support of
impressive and powerful officials and politicians. The
surgency was not only to meet the eviction deadlines of the
garment companies. There was also a rush to meet the deadlines
for UDAG and other public money (CDBG, etc.), precious and
difficult funds to obtain in current time of limited resources.
Facing the city's fast paced bandwagon approach, Chinatown.
community leaders, not presented with any alternative to the
BAB, endorsed the project.
Another Boston community, Dudley, will soon face the
redevelopment of their neighborhood. They would do well to
heed these lessons. City, state, federal agencies and their
money will be involved in the development. What happens in
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that whole corridor will shape not only the neighborhood's
physical look and local economy but the very fabric of the
community. This can be a significant opportunity for change,
one that is not likely to happen again for several decades, if
ever. It is important for the Dudley community to take or make
the time to carefully evaluate the ramifications of proposed
developments. Community groups should not be rushed or tricked
into ineffective or unresponsive development just for the sake
of getting all of the public money that's available. This will
be another important task for community planners, to work
towards avoiding that mistake. Also, when analyzing proposed
projects, we should not confuse economic growth or development
with community-based economic development. Community economic
development must take place in the area, and create lobs,
housing, and stores primarily for those who live there.
Perhaps, if Chinatown groups had been more experienced and
organized, they would not have allowed their community to be
misused, however unwittingly, to obtain public funds (UDAG and
CDBG) earmarked for community development purposes for a
project that could not provide community-based economic
development. Here is another lesson for community groups.
Always remember that we, the community, are the consumers of
developments, and we must not allow ourselves to be taken
advantage of by developers. Too often we think of developers
as only private firms, but realistically public entities are
doing a good deal of the development going on in our neighbor-
hoods. As consumers, we have the right to a reasonable amount
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of warranty by, and accountability of, our public agencies. We
can and should demand participation and control in development
that occurs in our neighborhoods. Even if it appears that the
planning process of an agency does not have a format for
community participation, we can try to force our inclusion
through strategies like publicity campaigns that criticize this
unfairness and by publically opposing a program or projects.
In retrospect, if community planners in Chinatown examined
the BAB project record today, they would see that no planning
was going on there for Chinatown. A community planning
approach to the neighborhood's garment industry "crisis",
would have considered what was best for Chinatown in the long
term. That is, to stop reliance on the garment and service
industries and to develop a balanced neighborhood economy. The
convergence of many different Asian groups, and the special
problems that arose from this, were recognized by neighborhood
residents. It has become increasingly clear that what was (and
still is) needed more than ever in Chinatown was language and
skills training. The program negotiated with Tufts was a
community response to those needs. As described earlier,
groups since then are exploring other community economic
development activities, largely without the help of city
agencies.
From a community planning perspective, the Boston Army
base should have been opposed. The astounding amount of money
spent to retain and create so few garment industry jobs might
have been spent more effectively for education and job
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training. Even if UDAG funds could not be used for that kind
of program, a savvy planner could have used the garment
industry "crisis" as an opportunity to draw attention to the
structural economic problems of Chinatown residents, and to
lobby for similar amounts of money to work on those problems.
Although one might not expect such opposition to prevent an
otherwise strongly supported development from going forward, it
would strengthen the community's position to negotiate for
assistance and funding to implement the programs we feel meet
the needs of our residents.
Perhaps the planner would try to keep the garment firms
located in Chinatown, even unprotected and scattered, for as
long as possible, while devoting more of the community's time,
money and energy developing other neighborhood businesses and
designing appropriate job training programs.
A lesson for all communities is to realize that we can
oppose a development or any other kind of program. We can use
our opposition to programs to draw attention to our needs and
wants. As a strategy, even if we do not stop a project, we can
aim for what we want by demanding a higher price for our
support. To do this, we must be prepared and have the
ammunition (facts and figures) to opposed a certain project and
to support our own proposals. We cannot be passive, as
Chinatown was in the Boston Army Base Development. We must
continually ask questions, and refuse to be intimidated by
external factors like time and funding limitations. If we want
to control the shape of development in our neighborhoods, we
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must demand participation and power in the process, even if it
appears that the planning or funding agencies "have no room"
for us, or they "appear" to be doing a good job.
What happened in this case is instructive for all
communities. Most of these lessons are by no means new. We
may have seen the same mistakes or lessons time and again, but
as times change they can be disguised in unfamiliar forms. It
is important in the forefront of our minds, to look for them,
and to make these lessons an integral part of our planning
process.
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TABLE I: INDUSTRIAL CENTER TENANTS
Company Type
Printing
Apparel and Textile
Furniture and Fixture
Graphic Arts
Computer/Data Processing
Mail Service
Electronics
Wholesale Hardware
Food Products
Office Supplies
Medical Instrument Manuff.
Sheltered Workshop
Employment as of June 1986
Total 824
Black 56
Hispanic 24
Other Minority 83
163
Boston Res. 346
South Boston 72
Low Income 617
Female 375
Source: EDIC, January 1987
Number of
Companies
10
6
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
(7%)
(3%)
(10%)
(20%)
Number
of Jobs
262
296
25
26
13
105
3
38
8
13
43
13
FOOTNOTES
1. Interview with Regina Lee, Chinatown Community Leader and
member, Chinatown Housing and Land Task Force, December
1986.
2. Letters to the GSA described the devastating effects of
the loss of the garment industry to the Chinatown
community, cited statistics on the number of Chinese
workers employed by the garment industry (70% of Chinese
women), and warned by massive unemployment they could face
if garment jobs were not saved.
3. Background interviews with Regina Lee of CHLTF, Marilyn
Swartz Lloyd of EDIC, Karen Malfy of HUD, undated.
4. The results of the survey are contained in the previous
case study, which is Appendix I of this paper.
5. See Appendix IT for list of locations and scenarios.
6. In the previous case study questions were raised about
EDIC's prior interest in acquiring and redeveloping the
BAB. What has become clear is that the timing and
chronology of events is key. When the need for the
garment center arose, the site was due to become
available. EDIC wanted to purchase the building, but
everything "fit together" at that time could be
coincidental.
7. "The Frayed Garment Industry" Boston Globe, September 3,
1982.
8. Interview with Doug Herberich, Director of Development,
EDIC, December 4, 1986.
9. Keeping with the spirit of the UDAG Agreement, EDIC does
have hiring goals beyond its initial requirement. It aims
to lease space in BAB to firms whose employee make-up is
50% Boston residents, 25% minority, 25% women, and 80% low
to moderate income persons.
10. Melvin Wayne La Prade, "Towards A Comprehensive Evaluation
Framework: Issues in Evaluating the Urban Development
Action Grant Program", Cleveland State University, 1986,
P. 1.
11. Ibid., Appendix A.
12. Ibid., Appendix B.
13. Economic Development and Industrial Corporation, Boston
Army Base Urban Development Action Grant Application, July
1982.
14. Boston Area Office, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, staff memos, August 1982.
15. The attempt to include this provision was seen by some as
a political/appeasement strategy, since it was unlikely
that the city council or its legal staff did not know this
was illegal.
16. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
of Action Grants, Boston Army Base Agreement, Grant No.
B-82-AA-25-0108, July 1983.
17. Interview with Karen Malfy1, Community Planning and
Development Division, Boston Area HUD Office, December 1,
1986.
18. Boston Area Office, op. cit.
19. Interview with Karen Malfy, December 1, 1986.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Undated interviews with Regina Lee, Tunney Lee (city
planner), and Carol Matheson (BRA staff).
25. Interview with David Eliot, Chinatown Occupational and
Training Center, December 1986.
26. Background interview with Regina Lee.
27. Ibid.
28. EDIC did retain interpreters to help the transition go
more smoothly, and a new bus route was implemented by the
MBTA that made commuting relatively easy. These actions
are laudable, but in the end Chinatown residents obviously
did not have much opportunity to utilize these services.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This case study examines community economic development
through a project undertaken by the Economic Development and
Industrial Corporation (EDIC). EDIC is a quasi-public agency
in Boston created by the Mayor's office, whose mandate is to
implement neighborhood and community economic development by
targeting private/public investments and attracting specific
industries into depressed areas of the city.
This report evaluates EDIC's attempt to save the Chinatown
garment industry and its jobs, vital to the Chinatown economy.
The vast majority of working Chinese women in Chinatown are
dependent upon these garment jobs. With the recent expansion
of Tufts' New England Medical Center (TNEMC) into Boston's
traditional garment district, the industry has been threatened.
EDIC reached to the potential loss of the industry by seeking
an alternative site for these garment firms. The Boston Army
Base was chosen as the most suitable location. There is no
clear evidence that EDIC assessed other viable options beyond
relocation, which may have better addressed garment industry
needs.
To understand the context of this redevelopment effort, we
begin with an analysis of the historical evolution of Boston's
Chinatown, its residents, and its status as a Boston urban
neighborhood. We then examine national and local trends of the
garment industry, to understand the constraints within its
changing environment. Next we introduce the participants and
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explain their respective roles in the project. A brief
description of the site and it's present and anticipated uses
follows, for an understanding of development trends in the
area.
We then turn to the financial deal; what the sources were,
how it was put together, and why it works. While the financial
aspects of the deal for the Boston Army Base may have been well
thought out, it is still unclear whether it was the right
choice to meet the garment industry's needs. We conduct an
analysis of this vital question and whether or not this was in
fact community economic development.
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I. Introduction
This report is the product of a 3 month investigation into
the redevelopment of the Boston Army Base as a form of
community economic development. The Economic Development and
Industrial Corporation (EDIC), one of three development
agencies in Boston was established to retain existing
industrial jobs and create new ones, through a combination of
development planning and financial assistance or incentives for
the benefit of Boston neighborhoods.
This study analyzes EDIC's attempt to meet its mandate,
through the development of the Boston Army Base. As a public
authority, EDIC works closely with other public agencies and
local financial institutions in order to target their efforts
to neighborhood based industries. Their programs include real
estate development and management (Cross Town and Marine
Industrial Parks), financial assistance, and job training
(Boston Technical). The agency's stated (and highly
publicized) objective in this project has been to save jobs for
Chinese workers by keeping displaced Chinatown garment firms
near Chinatown, or at least in Boston. While their objective
is consistent with their purpose, it remains to be seen whether
or not this particular development project holds true to
community economic development.
To provide a framework for analysis, pertinent
characteristics of Chinatown, the garment industry, and the
Financing Community Economic Development
May 11, 1983
Page 1
BOSTON ARMY BASE FINAL REPORT May 11, 1983
current problem at hand will be presented. The ensuring chain
of events and description of the site, players, and financing
of the development project provides the context for an analysis
of the appropriateness of this project to address that problem
and community economic development in Chinatown.
II. Boston Chinatown
Boston's Chinatown, now America's fourth largest, followed
a development pattern similar to the Chinatowns throughout the
country. Its residents were almost exclusively men from the
provinces surrounding Canton, who intended on returning to
their families in China. Throughout America they met blatant
discrimination and violent racism, exemplified by the 1870
Nationalization Act, which excluded Chinese from citizenship.
Other laws prevented their families from joining them, and
still others restricted their freedom. Prejudice, extreme
differences in culture, language barriers and a different value
system drew the Chinese immigrants in each American city into
tight, insular communities.
Drastic changes in immigration laws after World War II
allowed thousands of Chinese to come to America. These
immigrants differed dramatically from their predecessors. They
were families from throughout China intent on staying in the
U.S. New immigrants continue to come to Boston at a rate of
300 a year. While Chinatown is their first home, their average
length of residence is only ten years. Although most would
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like to remain in Chinatown, the housing stock, built between
1835-1850 has undergone continuous intensive use, with little
reinvestment. There are now only 996 housing units, with over
70% of it is deteriorated. Of Boston's 15,000 Chinese only
5,000 live in Chinatown, though many return each day to work,
shop and visit. Chinatown is the cultural and business center
of the Chinese community. Afterall, 80 percent of Boston's
Chinese residents are foreign born.
The upwardly mobile Chinese, moving to Allston-Brighton,
the Fenway, or the suburbs, leave behind friends and relatives
living in sub-standard, over-crowded housing, unable to find
good jobs. In 1978 Chinatown's unemployment rate was 16%, and
its underemployment rate was 70%, with only 23% of the women
and 40% of the man fluent in English. The restaurant and
garment industries employ over 75% of the workforce. With both
husbands and wives working long hours, the gross median family
income in 1978 was only $6,000 (the lowest of any Boston
neighborhood).
In spite of low paying jobs until 1970 Chinatown was
economically self sufficient, but with 200 Boston area
restaurants the market is saturated. The significance of this
cannot be underestimated since all but $3,416,000 of the
$18,512,000 gross income of Chinatown businesses' annual income
in the mid 1970's was related to restaurants. This is coupled
with the national decline of the garment industry. Chinatown's
growth sector industries, health, construction, and electronics
do not hire Chinese workers. In 1978, only 60 to 70 Chinese
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were employed in electronics, 60 to 70 in construction, and
they comprised only 2% of the Tufts New England Medical Center
workforce.
Much of Chinatown's overcrowding is due to the building of
the Southeast Expressway and the Mass Pike Extension in the
1960's, and the expansion of Tufts New England Medical Center.
These developments took half of Chinatown's land and housing.
Today the continued development of Tufts New England Medical
Center, the renewal of the Theatre District, South Station
redevelopment, construction of Lafayette Place, Park Plaza, the
U.S. Department of Transportation complex, and multiple office
buildings are causing land values to skyrocket, making crucial
housing development almost impossible, while few direct
benefits from this development go to the Chinese community.
Although this massive growth brought new customers to
Chinatown's restaurants, few Chinese were hired in the
construction of these projects or to work in them once
completed. Language and racism are still the primary barriers
for Chinese getting good jobs and this encirclement of
Chinatown by incompatible and competing land uses threatens
it's survival.
Both the City and the State have historically ignored the
needs of Chinatown. This could be because only 20% of
Chinatown's residents are registered voters. There are also
several conflicting community groups, each trying to speak for
Chinatown. A rally held on May 2, 1983, to express opposition
to Tuft's continued expansion, is a good example of this split
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in leadership. The Chinese Economic Development Council
(CEDC), the agency responsible for Chinatown community economic
development, was very obviously not present, nor a member of
the organizing effort. The Chinese Benevolant Association, the
Merchant's Association, CEDC, and the Chinatown Task Force each
have different visions for Chinatown and different expoused
strategies.
Few government, social service, or job training dollars
reach Chinatown. A 1963 "letter of understanding" from Mayor
Collins, giving the community veto power over outside
developers was ignored and Tufts was not forced to consult the
community before implementing development plans. On
innumerable occasions, Chinese community members protested the
City's, at worst blatant support, and at best quiet tolerance
of Tufts expansion and other development projects in spite of
their negative effects on Chinatown.
The City took a new role in 1981, with the BRA and then
EDIC leading the attempt to save the Chinatown garment industry
and its 600-2000* jobs, 25-50 percent* held by Chinese women.
The garment industry had steadily declined since the early
1960's but Tufts threatened eviction of a large number* of
firms at 15 and 35 Kneeland Street, brought the issue to the
public's attention and precipitated the City's involvement.(1)
Financing Community Economic Development
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III. Garment Industry
The garment industry is America's only major manufacturing
industry to escape the economic forces that lead to
concentration, automation, costly technology, limited entry,
and non-entrepreneurial management in other industries. In
many ways, the garment industry has not changed since the
nineteenth century, and its labor force continues to be
primarily immigrant women, though the Jewish immigrants of the
early 1900's have been replaced by Chinese and Hispanic women.
Although there was an increase of large automated firms in the
1970's, the industry continues to be primarily made up of
small, highly labor-intensive, competitive, volatile firms,
averaging 20 to 50 workers, with limited economies of scale and
producing for local and regional markets.
The nature of the industry is due to the transitory nature
of fashion styles and constant seasonal changes which make
large scale production impossible. Market instability keeps a
narrow ceiling on firm size and necessitates a large, flexible,
labor force. Producing in response to sudden shifts in demand,
firms depend on constant communication between suppliers,
buyers, and competitors. This requires agglomeration. The
need for quick access to supplies and cheap labor, and rapid
delivery to markets, anchor the industry in urban centers.
Printing is the only American industry that has remained
predominantly in urban centers.
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One out of eight U.S. manufacturing workers are employed
by the garment and textile industries. The lack of general
awareness of the significance of the garment industry in the
American economy is probably due to the small size of most
firms and a workforce primarily comprised of immiqrant women.
The average paycheck of a garment worker is 50 percent below
that of all other manufacturing employees, in spite of the fact
that the required skill for a stitcher are comparable to other
manufacturing jobs. The average U.S. garment worker's hourlv
wage is $4.35 per hour compared to $7.22 per hour in Sweden.
The large increase of imported clothing in the 1970's
(700% between 1961-1972) and the stagflation of the economy
caused a major decline in the garment industry. In fact, it
was the first U.S. industry to be threatened by foreign imports
and by American manufacturers, who moved their operations
overseas in search of cheap labor. Although some firms
increased their technology to maximize their productivity and
other firms moved to the southeast, looking for cheaper labor,
many firms were forced to close. In fact, 200,000 U.S. garment
jobs were lost between 1970 and 1980. The ILGWU is currently
organizing a massive lobbying effort to get Congress to reduce
import quotas from 40 to 25 percent, which they believe is the
only way to save the industry in the long run.
The garment industry came to Boston's South Cove in the
1860's. Until recently, the availability of cheap Chinese
labor and the closeness to the downtown retail district kept
the industry in the area. Most firms were located on Kneeland
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and Essex Streets, the heart of Chinatown. Recent evictions,
threats of evictions, or rent increases have caused many owners
to seek alternative locations. It is interesting to note that
the district's growth in the 1940's and 1950's displaced many
residents and added to the substantial loss of Chinatown's
housing stock. Some Chinatown leaders now fear that the loss
of the garment firms causing the loss of hundreds of jobs*
threatens the economic foundation of Chinatown.
Even though the garment industry remains Boston's second
largest manufacturing employer (printing is the first), it is
small compared to other garment centers, particularly New York
City and San Francisco. Boston's eight thousand* employees are
less than 1/4 of the 36,000 Massachusetts garment workforce.
Both Fall River and New Bedford have relatively large garment
centers, dominated by a few large firms.
Although the Boston industry is made up of approximately
52 to 185 firms*, each employing an average of forty workers,
most of the work is contracted by one company, "College Town",
a sportswear company whose main office is in Braintree.
"College Town's" clothes are targeted to middleclass women
looking for moderate priced items. This market is particularly
import sensitive.
The survival of Boston's garment industry is obviously
linked to "College Town". Two of the factors that have enabled
large firms's like "College Town" to compete with the imports
is a shorter lead time (foreign companies require six months)
and the ability to make special arrangements with textile
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firms. Boston's overall advantage is the continued
availability of an immigrant female labor force.
The Boston garment industry followed the national pattern
of large numbers of firm closing between 1969 and 1979 followed
by an apparent stabilization. 148 firms representing 4,000
jobs either closed or moved from Boston during this period.
Some of Chinatown's firms moved to other parts of Boston
(particularly East Boston) in the late 1970' s due to increased
rents, inability to find additional space for expansion, or
evictions. Confronted in 1981 with the immediate possibility
of Tufts evicting the firms in 15 and 35 Kneeland Street, the
city acting through EDIC decided to attempt to find a solution
that would keep these firms in Boston and as close to Chinatown
as possible.
IV. Players
The following agencies or groups played a role in the
development of the Boston Army Base: the BRA, EDIC, garment
firms, local ILGWU, State Street and Shawmut banks, Chinatown
Housing and Land Development Task Force (Task Force), HUD, the
Chinese Benevelent Association, the Chinese Economic
Development Council, and the Tufts New England Medical Center.
Our purpose here is to focus on the major players in the
project while providing a brief description of some others
involved.
EDIC, the Economic Development and Industrial Corporation,
is the main actor and leader in this development of the Army
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Base. As a public authority, EDIC works closely with other
public agencies and local financial institutions in order to
target their efforts to neighborhood based industries. By
combining real estate development and management (Cross Town
Industrial Park) financial assistance (leveraging loans,
revenue bonds and federal funds) , and job training, EDIC has
established a successful track record thus far. In developing
the Boston Army Base, EDIC felt they were serving their purpose
or mission. They responded to what they thought was an urgent
community need - keeping the garment firms in Boston. The loss
of garment firms would mean many Chinatown residents would lose
their primary source of employment.
In 1981, garment firms and other agencies requested EDIC's
assistance in dealing with the Tufts Medical Center expansion,
which would cause displacement and financial hardship to many
firms. EDIC worked closely with GIRA, the Garment Industry
Relocation Association, an organization comprised of firms,
community reps, and banking and union officials. EDIC helped
to negotiate with Tufts on behalf of the firms. What ensued
has become known as the Boston Army Base project, for which
EDIC has secured the funding for the acquisition, rehab, and
long term financing.
EDIC's first involvement was to coordinate attempts to
persuade Tufts to extend their leases. Once Tufts agreed to an
extension until July 31, 1983, EDIC coordinated the development
of a relocation plan. In the fall of 1981, at the reque'st of
EDIC, the Garment Industry Relocation Association (GIRA), made
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up of representatives of the TLGWU, the garment industry, the
Task Force and others, hired Bob Kenny (formerly director of
the BRA) of Urban Consulting to assist them in 1) site
identification for relocation; 2) financial feasibility
analysis; and 3) neqotiating with Tufts and city/state/and
federal agencies. Together with EDIC, the BRA and Kenny
considered several sites for relocation and surveyed garment
industry needs. Of the 47 firms surveved, 16 companies
expressed interest in the Boston Army Base site; earlier 25 to
30 firms expressed interest in the base. The total square
footage required was estimated to be 400,000 to 600,000 square
feet. The site was narrowed to Building 114 of the Boston Army
Base, although the criteria used in the decision making process
is not clear. EDIC then announced that the city would attempt
to purchase Building 114 to serve as the site of Boston's new
garment center.
In the past, the BRA had been sharply criticized by the
leaders of the Chinese comnunity, who perceived the BRA as
supporting Tufts development, in spite of its substantial
adverse effects on Chinatown. After being apprised of the
threatened firms evictions, the BRA negotiated with Tufts New
England Medical Center, and helped persuade them to extend
their leases and not to raise the rents. The cause for the
BRA's changed pattern of action is not clear though orders mav
have come from the Mayor's office.
Representatives from the ILGWU see themselves as
organizers in this project. Previously, there had been no
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unity amongst qarment firm owners. In order to save unior
members' jobs, the Union knew that they had to initiate an
effort to keep the firms in Boston. Many times, thev acted as
coordinators and a liason between EDIC, the firms, and workers.
Both Congressman Moaklev and Senator Tsonqas became
involved when Brian Dacev, executive director of EDIC,
reanested their assistance in obtaining the Boston Army Base
site. They helped EDIC obtain a P75,000 plannina grant from
the Department of Defense to conduct a market feasibility and
site development study. Later these government officials
lobbied for the acquisition of the building from the GSA, and
used their political influence to help EDIC obtain its UDAG and
other federal financing for the project.
First National Bank and Shawmut were represented on the
Garment Industry Relocation Association. Their interests in
the association were as lenders to the various garment firms.
In June of 1982, after the Boston Army Base was chosen as the
site for the industry location, First National Bank was
approached by Brian Dacey and Marilyn Swartz Llovd, of EDIC,
with a proposed budget pro-forma on the project. First
National felt they needed more information before thev could
proceed. When the pro-forma on the facility was brought to
State Street Bank later that summer, State Street agreed to
pursue the project further, following a cursory review.
Shawmut was brought into the deal in late September.
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V. Site
Historically, the growth of Boston's economic base has
been uneven. It has occured in specific clustered areas,
emanating from central points within the city proper. The
Prudential Center, City Hall Plaza and the new Federal Reserve
Building have been stepping stones for development. Much of
the underutilized and vacant areas of space surrounding these
points have been captured by developers yet gaps still remain
to be filled. With the recent construction of the new Federal
Reserve Building, development trends in Boston are heading
towards the Southeast sector of the Waterfront, tightening up
the area between the North Atlantic and Summer Street bridges.
Projects for that area, either planned, proposed or
underway include EDIC's Marine Industrial Park, redevelopment
of the Boston Army Base and its container points, Massport's
piers, (Boscom), Commonwealth Pier, a new Northern Avenue
bridge and sea access road to Logan Airport. If development
projects succeed as planned, then the location of EDIC's Army
base project and the surrounding assembled land, will become
increasingly desirable to developers, merchants, and future
residents.
The Boston Army Base is comprised of the three major
buildings, Buildings 113, 114, and 119. Building 113 is the
smaller of the three, and housed Army administrative offices.
The U.S. Army used Building 114 as a training site, and for a
computer and storage facility, but phased out most of its
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operations on the base about seven years ago. Currently, some
of their computer facilities are housed in the building and two
private manufacturers - Personnel and Breckenridge sportswear
companies rent space in the building. Building 114 has 1.6
million square feet. Building 119, or 666 Summer Street, is
actually owned by the Navy, but because it is on the Army base,
the Army is the caretaker of the Building. Currently Building
119 is leased to Massport, who in turn leases the space to
local major supermarket chains for warehousing their incoming
goods.
The city has recently submitted a proposal to the Navy,
offering Boston as the homeport for the Surface Action Group
(SAG). Under the proposal, the Navy's building on the 31 acre
site would be rennovated and used to berth and accomodate the
group of warships. The SAG consists of five vessels, including
the battleship USS Iowa, a guided missile cruiser, a destroyer,
and two guided missile destroyers. The proposal was sponsored
by EDIC, the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, and the
Massport Authority. This project would create thousands of new
jobs, increase civilian and military payroll in the area by a
total of $143 million dollars, and would bring the city many
new ship related contracts. It would also attract tenants for
Sections A, E, and F in Building 114, the sections for which
EDIC has said they currently have no plans. The food companies
now housed in Building 119 would have to move, possibly
becoming tenants at Building 114.
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Although New York and Newport, Rhode Island are also
competing for the site, it appears that Boston could offer the
best resource to the Navy. Buildings 114 and 119 are housed on
the largest drydock in any eastern seaport. There is 5,450
linear feet of pier space - more than enough to berth all of
the vessels in the SAG. Presently, the facilities are
underutilized, operating on a strictly commercial level. If
the Navy were to accept the proposed "Homeport Boston", then
the city could operate the port on a timeshare basis,
alternating between Navy and commerical vessels. The natural
harbor of Boston is another factor that makes the Boston Army
Base site appealing to the Navy. It is closer to the major sea
lanes and Northern European parts than any other city in the
country. Also of major importance is the fact that the base
was recently occupied by the Navy (1974) and can now be
renovated without exhorbitant cost.
VI. Financial Deal
The financial package for the purchase and redevelopment
of the Boston Army Base was orchestrated by the Economic
Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston (EDIC). It is
an innovative package of both public and private funds.
Included in the deal are four major sources of funds, a $3.644
million Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) loan from HUD, a
$5.950 Industrial Revenue Bond, $.427 million in EDIC equity
including Neighborhood Development Funds and a Community
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Development Block Grant, and $3 million in syndication equity.
The deal has changed many times, taking a number of forms.
The major components of the first package brought before the
banks included a proposed $4 million Urban Development Action
Grant loan from HUD, $1.2 to $1.4 million in equity from the
Massachusetts Government Land Bank, private outside syndication
of $2.5 million and a tax exempt Industrial Revenue Bond of
$4.5 million.
The UDAG loan application for funds for the Boston Army
Base was contingent on the retention of industry and jobs, the
creation of new jobs, and consideration of the socioeconomic
ramifications to the Chinese community. HUD would not even
consider Boston's application until a sales agreement on the
Army Base was reached with the U.S. General Services
Administration (GSA). EDIC's independent appraisal of the
property by Minot, Debois and Maddison, was at $1.5 million,
while the GSA appraised the property at a value of $4.1
million. EDIC felt pressured to make a deal quickly lest all
of their efforts fall through. They wanted the financing to be
in place by January of 1983 so they could start renovations and
have the Center ready by the summer of 1983.
It was necessary to have the Center ready at this time as
the garment firms in 15 and 35 Kneeland Street had a reprieve
from Tufts University's eviction proceedings and rent increases
through June of 1983. The UDAG grant contingent on the saving
of those garment industry jobs and if the UDAG was not
allocated in that round, it is doubtful that EDIC could use the
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saving of those garment lobs as iustification as the building
would not be ready in time to save them. The final negotiated
price for the property and building was $3.5 million. EDTC met
the deadline, though thev did not get a good price on the
building. Still, they were able to get the TJDAG in that round
as needed for the acauisition of the Boston Army 'ase. The
UDAG award came lust one week after the negotiated $3.5 million
Army Base Building 114 sale agreement with the GSA.
The aarment industro project, including rehabilitation was
initially estimated at a cost of $14.7 million, based on an
engineering study prepared by Anderson-Nichols and Company,
Inc. The estimate had been revised upward, given the higher
acquisition and improvement costs, to $17.555 million. This
figure includes the full purchase price of $3.5 million and an
estimated $1 million in leasehold improvements by the garment
industry and other tenants. It takes into account renovations
to sections B, C, and D of Building 114 only, for a total of
825,400 square feet for garment/industrial use (of which only
785,400 square feet is rentable). Sections A, E, and F of the
Building are not included in this industrial/garment center
prolect, and financing for these sections is entirely separate.
Plans for these sections have not been officially developed,
nor disclosed by EDIC, beyond calling it a light industrial
complex to be developed in the future.
More formal Bank estimates of the project cost eliminate
$2.2 million of the acquisition cost from the garment center
prolect and accrue it to the Budget for sections A, E, and F,
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putting the total cost of the project at $15.355 million,
including leasehold improvements. This $2.2 million was
eliminated from the budget because State Street Bank, the lead
bank in the deal (and the coordinator of all financial aspects
of this package) stipulated that no more than $1.3 million be
allowed for acquisition. The Bank backed into this figure by
first determining the hard and soft costs of construction and
then deducting this cost from the total sources of income. One
of the biggest risks to the bank is the construction risk.
Funds must be sufficient to complete the project. It was up to
the developer, EDIC in this case, to find money to make up the
difference between the full acquisition cost and the allowable
acquisition advance. EDIC obtained a $2.2 million HUD 108
loan, which applied as the acquisition cost for sections A, E,
and F only. Payments for the HUD 108 loan will come from
present tenant leases in those sections.
The major sources of project funding going into the final
closing, which is expected in mid-May of 1983, include the
$3.644 million UDAG loan from HUD, $3 million in private
syndication from DLJ Real Estate, Inc., some $1.7 million in
EDIC equity, and a $5.95 million industrial Revenue Bond
purchased by Merrill Lynch and backed by the State Street and
Shawmut Banks. Listed sources of EDIC equity include
$140,000-planning grants. $420,000-leasing overhead,
$775,000-administration, $127,000-Neighborhood Development
Fund, and $300,000 Community Development Block Grant (CDBG).
(See Appendix B.)
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Part of this $1.7 million in EDIC equity, which qoes
toward some of the soft costs, are in fact nnt true costs to be
charged to the project, and are considered by State Street Bank
as a "sweat equity" contribution by EDIC. These expenses
either have alreadv been paid for (Miscellaneous Development
Costs) or oay for themselves (they are considered both costs
and eauitv) . The only real money equity that EDIC is
contributing, from the Bank's view, is a Neighborhood
Development Fund of $427,000 and a Community Development Block
Grant of $300,000, for a total contribution of $427,000.
State Street Bank's Estimates
for the Total Project Cost and
Total Sources of Funds
Resources (in millions $) Costs (in millions $)
Ind. Rev. Bonds 5.950 Acquisition 1.300
UDAG 3.644 Hard Const. Costs 9.378
EDIC Equity .427 Soft Costs 2.342
Syndication 3.000
13.021 13.020
Missing from the deal is the Massachusetts Government Land
Bank. The Land Bank has historically had a strong relationship
with EDIC. Yet, the deal was restructured in December of 1982
without the Land Bank due to technical reasons, predominantlv a
conflict as co-participant in the mortgaqe with the commercial
banks. The tax exempt Industrial Revenue Bond purchased by
Merrill Lynch is sold to individual investors who must be left
in a riskless position. Thus, State Street Bank, the lead bank
in the deal, and Shawmut Bank, as the participant bank,
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(sharing the risk equallv) issued a letter of credit in favor
of Merrill Lvnch for the industrial Revenue Bond. Tf EDIC can
not meet the payments and the bonds go into default, Merrill
Lvnch can call under the letter of credit, thus protecting the
individual consumers of the bonds. if this haRnens, the full
amount of the letter of credit is paid by State Street and
Shawmut to Merrill Lvnch. Tn return, State Street and Shawmut
would hold the first mortcgaqe, a position of collateral, and
would control the real estate.
The Land Bank conflict was that they would have been a
shared participant in the first mortgage with State Street and
Shawmut Banks which would have depleted the Banks' collateral
position by $1.4 million and thev would have meant shared
control of the propertv. Yet, the Land Bank is an agency of
the Commonwealth and there is presently debate in the
Legislature regarding the Land Bank's future existence. Given
the potential elimination of the Land Bank there was the
question of who would then be the co-participant. It was
assumed that the Legislature would probably take that control
and the banks were opposed to such a partnership. Thus, with
State Street taking the initiative, the Land 'ank was forced
out of the deal.
There were other benefits to the deal without the
involvement of the Land Bank. The original Land Bank financing
was to be at an interest rate of 14 percent. That financing
was transferred to the Industrial Revenue Bond. Merrill 1-vnch
has quoted the Bond at 10 1/4 percent (though this is expected
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to go down even further to 9.875 or 10 percent by closing, due
to financial market conditions), resulting in a cost savings to
the project. Also, for the Land Bank to raise the money, they
would have had to float a state backed bond issue and sell the
bonds which would have cost the project from $120 to $150
thousand. The restructuring of the deal increased the Banks'
exposure, but gave them a stronger collateral position and
provided cost-saving into the budget.
In return for the letter of credit, State Street and
Shawmut receive a fair rate of return for their risk in an
amount of 1.5% per annum of the face amount of the letter of
credit (equal to the outstanding principal . balance). State
Street is also the Trustee of the Industrial Revenue Bond, and
as such, services the account; collecting and disposing
payments. For this, they receive a servicing fee of close to
$5,000 annually. This is paid by the project.
The $5.95 million Industrial Revenue Bond (IRB) is on a 25
year schedule. While not yet officially rated, State Street
expects that Standard & Poors will give the Bond an A rating,
standard for a State Street letter of Credit. According to the
terms of the deal, as it now stands, the first five years of
the project require interest only payments at 10.25 percent
(though expected to go down), payable semi-annually. In years
6 through 10, the loan is amortized at 2% in addition to the
interest payments, while for years 11 through 20 it is
amortized at 4.5% plus interest. A balloon payment of the
principal is to be made in year 20 of the project.
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There is a $19 million capital expenditure cap on the
Industrial Revenue Bond. This means that $19 million is the
maximum amount that may be spent on this project for any
capital improvements going back three years and forward three
years, including any made by those leasing the space. Had the
UDAG monies not been a part of this package, the IRB cap on
capital expenditures would have been $10 million. In effect,
the UDAG leveraged the potential for extra money into the
project. This stipulation precludes any higher use of sections
B, C, and D for at least three years. Once the limit is
reached, remaining space can not be leased if they intend to
put more money into improvements. The $19 million can not be
exceeded for the six years total or the IRB can not be used.
As a stipulation for their backing of the Industrial
Revenue Bond, the Bank has required EDIC to pre-lease enough
space to more than cover the 1984 Industrial Revenue Bond debt
payment, as well as the IRB Letter of Credit fee and the
servicing fee on the IRB. (Payments on the UDAG do not start
until 1988 and City taxes were waived for 1983 and 1984. The
only other project debt in 1984 is $75,000 in Ground Lease
payable to EDIC. Yet this payment is subordinated to the IRB
payments.) In order to cover this 1984 IRB debt, EDIC must
pre-lease 412,776 square feet of the Building (sections B, C,
and D) , or just under 53 percent of the total rentable space.
This takes into account two major pre-leases of a combined
297,387 square feet that have already been arranged. The Bank
backed into the requirement that a balance of 120.393 square
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feet be leased at a rental rate of $2.62 per square foot by
June of 1983. The tax waiver was essential to making this deal
work.
EDIC claims to be starting their rents at $2.75 a square
foot including taxes, with an additional $.50 for heat. (Yet,
an EDIC letter dated April 15, 1983, in which they are actively
seeking possible state agency tenants, quoted the rents as
starting at $2.45 a square foot.) The terms of the rent are 8
to 10 year leases, with five year renewal options and no tax
escalator in the lease. Yet there are kickers in the leases,
step ups over the years, in which the rents will go up. The
exclusive Real Estate Agent for the project is the Codman
Company, Inc. By late April, 1983, EDIC had leased 35 percent
of the space. EDIC has until the middle of May, 1983, or June
1st at the latest, to pull the required 53 percent leased space
into the project, to cover the Industrial Revenue Bond debt, or
else they will have to renegotiate the deal. EDIC and the
Codman Company are confident that they will meet the deadline.
While the bonds can be renegotiated after that date, the
syndication deal would fall apart. EDIC has signed a
syndication agreement with DLJ Real Estate, Inc., a subsidiary
of Wall Street investment firm Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc. Under this agreement, DLJ Real Estate forms a limited
partnership and sells $3 million in shares following
discounting, to private investors, whose liability is limited
to their investment. This $3 million goes into the project as
equity.
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Of the $3 million dollars in cash from the svndication,
$1.372 million is up front and the rest is secured by
promissory notes to be paid by the svndication over the next
five years. The notes are taken by State Street Bank as
collateral who lend the remaining $1.645 million for the start
of the prolect aqainst these investor notes. As the notes are
only as goo.d as the financial credibility of the individual
investors, and the information costs to determine that
credibility are extremely high, the syndication must buv a Bond
assurity so that if individual investors default, then the Bank
will be paid by the insurance company. The syndication must
make installment payments on the loan for five years (through
1988) . These yearly pavments are arranged to coincide closely
with the investors expected income from the tax depreciation.
The syndication deal is being sold to these individual
investors primarily for its benefit as a 1983 tax credit.
Because the investors would have a long term lease on a
renovated building that is older than 40 years, they would be
eligible for a 20% investment tax credit in the first year that
the building is occupied. As stressed by EDIC in their one
page summary of the syndication, "This is not a tax deduction,
but an actual credit: dollar for dollar. For example,
Building 114 will cost approximately $12 million to
rehabilitate. Twenty percent of $12 million is $2.4 million.
If you assume there are 30 investors, then each one will
receive a one-time tax credit of $80,000." To receive that
hefty tax credit on their 1983 taxes, it is crucial that most
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of the building be complete in 1983 and that it be occupied.
If the deal is not closed by June 1st, it becomes increasingly
doubtful that the buildinq will be readv in time. The
syndication deal will be lost and EDIC will be liable for a
penalty fee of more than $200,000.
Assuming the deal proceeds as planned, rather than owning
the building, the Boston Harbor Limited Partnership will lease
sections B, C, and D of Building 114 for 50 vears from EDTC
with an option for an additional 25 years. EDIC would be the
manager of the building and tenants would sublease their space
from the Limited Partnership. Under the terms of the lease,
the project (the syndication) pays EDIC $75,000 annually for
lease payment, which is subordinated to any prolect debt.
Although EDIC technically owns the property, by leasing the
land for at least 50 years, the investors can depreciate the
asset for the duration of the lease. The IRS accepts the fact
that the investors own the property. They are in effect buying
the tax benefits of depreciation. Yet, the true deed to the
property remains with EDIC and can not be transferred to the
syndication by State Street's stipulation and as it is also
essential for selling the tax free Industrial Revenue Bond. In
50 years, the investment deal will be off and EDIC will then
own the Boston Army Base.
In addition to the one-time investment tax credit, the
investors in the syndication may, for each of the next 15
years, deduct 1/15 of the value of the building on their' tax
return using a straight line depreciation. They may also
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receive any income left over after the bills are paid and EDIC
receives its land lease payment (this cash flow is expected in
the future). EDIC, in turn receives the income from the
"wrap-around" mortgage on the lease, at $75,000 annually. This
mortgage payment is just like rent, and will be used to pay off
the construction costs over the term of the project. In
addition, EDIC receives a management fee for management
services of the Building.
After the closing of the deal and the sale of the
syndication shares and Industrial Revenue Bond, EDIC will be
able to begin drawing down the UDAG at $1 of UDAG funds for
each $2.19 of private investment. The last two UDAG draws in
February and March of 1984 will require tenant improvements of
$487,000 for leverage. The terms of this $3.644 million loan
are at an interest rate of 3 percent over 30 years. UDAG
payments are due quarterly, beginning in the fifth year, the
UDAG is in second position in terms of payoff behind the
Industrial Revenue Bond, including IRB servicing and fees
through State Street Bank. These UDAG payments will return to
the City of Boston.
While the financing for this deal is most innovative,
there are still risks involved in this deal. The Boston Army
Base's financial success will be determined by circumstances
outside of the financial markets. These real market forces
that can affect the viability of this project, have been
considered in the terms of the financial deal in order to
safeguard against failure.
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The major market risk to the project is getting the Army
Base leased to cover the debt. The deal will be successful
only if there is enough demand for this type of space in this
location. According to financial projections, 1984 is the
critical year. It is the high risk period when the building
must be up, leased and operating. For the years 1985 and out,
income projections improve steadily. These financial
projections assume that market conditions for leased space on
the Army Base will be strong. Given the real market
projections for growth in the immediate area, these financial'
projections are realistic (barring, of course, any drastic
changes in the economy). Thus, by stipulating leases to cover
the 1984 debt before closing, the Bank controls for the major
risk to the deal's success.
Given the above precaution, the construction and
rehabilitation of Building 114 becomes the most critical factor
to success. Improvements must be completed within budget and
on a timely basis so that the tenants can move in and being
paying their rent. As the lease has an occupancy date, it is
imperative that the building be ready, lest the tenants can
legally break they lease. While not all problems can be
helped, such as potential strikes of construction workers or
other adverse market conditions, State Street Bank has taken
precautionary measures to see that construction difficulties
are not overlooked. While they say they feel EDIC has the
expertise to get the job done, the Bank has hired an outside
engineering firm, Merritt and Harris of New York, to analyze
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the specifications as they related to the building and the
budget, and to also oversee the construction process on an
ongoing basis. In addition, the Bank required adequate funding
be allocated to the construction process. This, they hope,
will lead to a completed building in the time necessary.
Representatives of both State Street and Shawmut Bank feel
that the deal is a good one. They will get a fair rate of
return on their letter of credit as well as good publicity in
this private/public partnership for investment into the City
for what was perceived as the saving of the garment industry,
the opening up of a predominantly vacant building, the
retention of jobs and the creation of new ones. State Street
feels that they have taken the proper precautionary measures to
minimize risk to the project and that the deal will be
successful financially.
Given the required minimum in leases before the deal can
close, a successful rehabilitation (on time and within budget),
and an expected market demand to fill the Building, the deal
will be a financial success. The syndication can then expect
its tax benefits, the Bank can expect payments on the
Industrial Revenue Bond and fees, and UDAG repayments will be
met, EDIC can expect a management fee and ground lease payment,
the City can expect substantial Real Estate taxes, and given
income beyond this, the syndication can hope to make profits in
the fiture. Then 50 years down the line, EDIC, or the City
will own the site, and all income generated from what may be a
very valuable piece of Real Estate.
Financing Community Economic Development Page 28
BOSTON ARMY BASE FINAL REPORT May 11, 1983
The parties involved seem confident that any obstacles
will be met. At present, the legal documents are being drawn
up and the closing on the property is expected by the end of
May of 1983, as planned, at which time the renovations will
commence. EDIC is currently negotiating leases with several
garment and apparel related firms as well as two printing
firms.
From the view of the Bank, financing for this deal is not
conventional by any means. Typical of the large deals being
made in the City today are for the office buildings going up in
downtown Boston. These are considered boom areas and draw
private investment dollars and financing. The Boston Army Base
property has been sitting idle for many years and is located in
an area that at present is far from booming, though future
prospects look good. The site is most suitable for light
industry, as opposed to office and retail use. Rent per square
foot of space must be low enough to draw such tenants. Given
the enormous cost to renovate this building, it is doubtful
that the private sector could renovate it to serve such
tenants. The rents needed to cover costs would be too great.
In effect, the only way to bring industry into this mostly
vacant idle building is through government subsidies or funds
of some sort. Yet, today's climate at the Federal level goes
against public spending and thus requires public/private
partnerships as stipulation for federal funds. Funds are
limited, and UDAGs, which are available but scarce, are no
longer given as grants, but loans, which must be matched by a
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level of private investment. Thus, a public/private
partnership is essential to making this deal work.
Given the Industrial Revenue Bond and the UDAG loan,
needed to complete the financing was the private partner and
equity. Yet, EDIC needed to retain real ownership and control.
The National Development Council, consultant for the financial
packaging, suggested a syndication with limited partnership to
provide equity in exchange for a long-term lease on the
building. It is not the return on their investment that makes
this such a good deal to the investors, but the federal tax
laws which permit a credit on taxes for all improvements to the
land and to the Building (sections B, C, and D), regardless of
whose money pays for the improvements. EDIC had no use for
these tax benefits. In this way, EDIC gets the equity for the
project that it needs and keeps legal title to the building,
while the syndication its tax benefit.
Ironically, the deal could not move ahead without a
private partnership because the Federal government wants to
reduce public sector spending for city programs. Yet, at the
same time, the Federal government will forego tax income from
the private sector for improvements to land. It is this policy
that allowed the deal to move ahead. Federal tax policy is
clearly a key to private development today, and in the end, the
Federal government pays anyways in taxes forgone.
All in all, the combination of the UDAG, syndication, and
the Industrial Revenue Bond made this a financially Viable
project. It takes cooperation between the private and public
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sectors to get such large scale projects done. Without this
cooperation, the project would not have proceeded to this
stage. While the project may have well been thought out
financially, the question remains as to whether or not the
project meets its stated goal and mission, and should in fact
proceed at all, given the extent of public monies involved and
the purposes to which that money has been allocated.
VII. Analysis
The story that unfolds in the analysis of this case is
that EDIC's actions were not consistent with its stated goals
and objectives. It is now clear that purchasing and renovating
the Army Base will not directly benefit Chinatown or Boston's
garment industry. At best, EDIC chose an inappropriate
intervention. Moreover, it appears that EDIC may have lost
sight of the purpose for its involvement, and has focussed most
of their effort on the development rather than the reason
behind it. Also, the fact that the Army Base project will not
address Chinatown's economic problems suggests that the city
did not really intend this development to do so, but instead
that the Army Base is merely a part of a whole other
development agenda.
EDIC's mandate is community economic development. The
agency's attempt to save Chinatown garment jobs is certainly
appropriate. But a variety of issues have been raised by this
study: 1) Was any government intervention necessary and/or
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could it be effective? 2) Where these garment jobs worth
saving? 3) Who will benefit from the development of Building
114? 4) Why did the city decide to buy Building 114?
After exploring the nature of the garment industry several
patterns emerge. Since the major threat to all U.S. garment
firms is foreign imports, the survival of Boston's firms is
dependent on national and international forces and decisions.
In the long run, anything that Boston does may be
insignificant. No matter how high the city's investment, these
firms can easily pack up and move to another region or country.
The firms that survived the "import crisis" of the 70's are
tied to Boston because their relationship with Collegetown
(major firm) and the availability of a trained labor force.
Clothing's high demand elasticity necessitates a low price
ceiling and therefore low rent costs. Before and after the
Tufts eviction crisis Chinatown firms were able to find
affordable relocation sites on their own. Firms that moved to
East Boston, for example, run buses to and from Chinatown.
Given the projected character of the Army Base area, it is
questionable whether or not small garment companies will be
able to sustain operations in a competitive market so
dissimilar to that of Chinatown. When examining the leasing
conditions of the Army Base, one questions who the building
will actually serve. Presently garment firms rent space on a
variable rate basis. If a smaller company acquires a large
contract, the lessor will allocate more space accordingly.
This allows tenants flexibility, so they don't encumber
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themselves with unnecessary overhead costs. In Building 114,
tenants will be required to lease a minimum of 34,000 square
feet at $2.75/square foot. Although two bays of 17,000 square
feet have been subdivided to accomodate the spatial needs of
smaller firms, most of the leases will be for larqer amounts of
space. With these leasing terms entrv may be limited to only
the larger garment firms. IF this is so, EDIC planned poorly,
for the use of the building as a garment center is now
unlikely. Indeed, while many of' the lease negotiations are
with apparel related industries, most of the space will
probably be rented to other light industrial firms.
There are strong indications that now many of the firms
originally in jeopardy can not or will not move to the Army
Base. Sources at the BRA, EDIC, and Urban Consulting
Associates have given the following reasons for this: some
firms failed during the most recession; some firms renegotiated
their terms at their present locations, higher volume firms
moved to more desirable locations, and many firms were forced
out of their buildings and could not wait for the Army Base to
become available. EDIC did help relocate some firms to other
sites, and assisted them with moving costs.
Ron Altman, the regional director of ILGWU, insists that
EDIC's determination to complete this proiect convinced many
owners that the city was concerned about their needs.
Ironically, a good number of firms have moved to the Fargo
Building, which is less than one half mile away from Building
114. These firms used the option of an Army Base lease to
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negotiate favorable leasing terms with the Fargo and other
landlords. It's unlikely that this positive outcome of the
development was neither planned nor expected by EDIC.
There is no evidence that at any point during the
development process that EDIC adequately assessed all available
options to help solve the problems facing Chinatown and the
garment industry. Were market analyses conducted to determine
if the market would cure itself? Also, were any of EDIC's
other programs more appropriate for the firms needs (such as
direct loans or job training)? At the point at which EDIC
arrived at its intervention strategy, they became fixed on the
development aspects of their role. It is not clear whether or
not they weighted the long term effects of this program against
other alternatives.
All of EDIC's public statements focus on the need to
develop the Boston Army Base to save Boston's garment industry
and Chinatown jobs. Perhaps EDIC misinterpreted the needs of
the garment firms, ignored the real economic needs of
Chinatown, and misjudged the complexity of this development
process. EDIC certainly could have discerned that their
program intervention was highly suceptible to external and/or
market forces that could render it ineffective. This risk
highlights the questionable justification for the large sume of
money spent to save an "undertermined" number of jobs.
The question of whether these jobs are worth saving is
complex. The garment industry does not provide "good jobs",
defined by David Gordon as "adequate wages and fringe benefits,
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job security and stable employment, decent working conditions,
and opportunities for advancement and control". On the other
hand, what other options are possible for the non-English
speaking, fifty year old Chinese women dependent on these jobs
for their livelihood? The garment shops are in fact a social
institution in Chinatown, and their flexible hours allow many
women to work and still be able to care for their children.
Historically, the garment industry has provided the only entry
into the American labor market for new immigrants, and three
hundred new Chinese immigrants are arriving in Boston each
year. The Chinatown Housing and Land Development Task Force,
in its efforts to save Chinatown's firms, made it clear that it
was not defending the industry but that the garment firms were
an economic necessity to the community. An interesting aside
is that the Task Force was not appraised of EDIC's plans or
asked to participate in site selection. Members of the Task
Force began attending GIRA meetings to express community
concerns. It is possible that earlier Task Force participation
could have lead to a different outcome. Efforts may have been
more realistically focussed on the needs of Chinatown workers,
although the Task Force and other community leaders did
publically supported the Army Base project.
There is another hypothesis for EDIC's avid interest in
developing the Boston Army Base. The staff admits that the
agency has been interested in purchasing Building 114 before it
was proposed as a relocation site for the garment firms. The
description of the Army Base points out its prime location for
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development. The grant money spent on infrastructure on this
project will enhance EDIC's other development in the area, as
the Base is contiguous with it's Marine Industrial Park. Also,
if the site is chosen for the Surface Action Group, purchasing
Building 114 will prove to be a very strategic and profitable
decision. The garment industry "crisis" may have arisen at a
convenient time, but the city is intent on developing that area
and would not have purchased the building anyway. However, the
UDAG, which was the key financial leverage of this development
deal, could not have been obtained without the stated objective
of retaining minority workers' jobs.
There is still question as to whether or.not the Army Base
deal will come to fruition. The required minimum amount of
space was not rented as of May 1, 1983, while the closing
deadline is June 1, 1983. However, analyzing this development
by deciding if EDIC was justified in risking the purchase of
Building 114 is not sufficient. The primary question is can
this project be justified as community economic development?
If the community was supposed to be Chinatown, the answer is
clearly no.
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Number
of
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% Chinese
1,500
4,600 "Mostly"
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25
11
35
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4,000 27
4,000 27
4,618
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6,087
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1,782/52%
1,400
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1,500
1,700
Source
CEDC, 1978
Boston Globe, 9/3/82
Task Force
Boston Globe, 2/16/82
EDIC Fact Sheet (undated)
GIRA, 11/2/81
Brian Dacey, 10/8/81
Boston Globe, 8/9/82
Dan Fishbein, 3/9/81
Dan Fishbein, 6/4/81
Memo to Dan Fishbein
6/4/81
Number
Boston
Firms
Number
of
Workers-
Firms
in
Chinatown
52
213
185
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5,656-
12,426
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TO: Brian F. Dacey, Marilyn Swartz Lloyd, Martha Goldsmith
FROM: Dan Fishbein -
DATE: March 9, 1981
RE: Relocation of Garment and Leather Goods Firms
Attached is a statistical profile of the Boston garment industry, information
on companies which have requested relocation assistance, and a list of
potential sites for relocation. These materials are summarized below:
PROBLEM
* 4,000.jobs at stake, 130 companies in garment and
leather districts threatened by downtown expansion.
e 90% of employees are Boston residents, most are
low-skilled minorities.
e Would totally negate the 4,000 industrial job
increase since 1977.
* Primary reason for dislocation is increasing demand
for office and housing space. Secondary reasons:
BRA planned reallignments of South Street and
Atlantic Avenue, expansion ,of Tufts University Medical
Center, congestion, and desire for equity.
COMPANIES REQUESTING ASSISTANCE
a 21 companies employing 1,700 people.
* Must remain near Chinatown. Interested in nearby
locations in South End and South Boston.
COURSE OF ACTION
* BRA makes 4.5 acres of land at 433-439 & 543 Harrison
Avenue available.
p EDIC makes BMIP entranceway area and Army Base
available.
- Request that Massport consider making space available
in Naval Recreation area and Commonwealth Flats.
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
o- 18 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108 /1 (617) 725-3342
Brian F. Dacey, Marilyn Swartz Lloyd, Martha Goldsmith
March 9, 1981
Page 2
* BIDFA and First National Bank of Boston make
industrial revenue bond financing available
for new construction.
s EDIC/BRA subsidize development pending need
and availability (.Government Land Bank, 121A
or in-lieu-of-tax agreement with land lease,
EDA Trade Adjustment Assistance).
TIME FRAME
* Most firms must find a new location within 1
year. Up to 1,000 jobs have been lost during
the past year.
With a few exceptions, the companies which have contacted EDIC/Boston are
most interested in locating at the BMIP or the BRA properties on Harrison
Avenue, near E. Berkeley Street. Given the large number of companies which
must relocate it may be feasible to construct new buildings at both locations
with 1 or 2 anchor firms at each location. Two financially sound firms,
Berman Leather and A vanced Electronics, are most interested in the South
End property, while Fitwe ght anchor a South Boston facility.
The First National Bank of Boston has shown some interest in purchasing
industrial revenue bonds or providing some other financing for a new facility
if an anchor company takes responsibility for amortizing the loan.
It may also be worthwhile to urge Massport to lease or sell 4-5 acres of
the 29-acre Naval Recreation Area or 22-acre Commonwealth Flats site.
The location of a garment/leather industry facility on a small portion of -
1 of these sites would not interfere with Massport's interest in providing
space for maritime-related development.
DF:jm
xc: Henry Price
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
E IIC/Ilostonm
TO: Dan Fishbein
FROM: Mike Adams & Sandra Curry
DATE: March 5, 1981
RE: Profile of Garment Industry
The garment industry in Boston-includes 213 firms employing between 5656 and
12,426 persons. The average number of employees per company is 41. The
following is a breakdown of the industry according to products produced and
the location of firms. The information was compiled from EDIC/Boston's
Directory of Boston Employers. The employment figures are based on employment
range categories used in the Directory.
The largest concentrations of'firms in the garment industry are located in the
downtown area, South Boston, East Boston and the Washington Street and Massachusetts
Avenue area of Roxbury.
CITYWIDE DOWNTOWN
PRODUCT
# of Firms # of Employees # of Firms # of Employees
1. Men's & boy's
suits, coats, 38 728-2011 23 336-1008
& furnishings
2. Women's outer-
wear and under- 110 3462-7696 72 2056-4521
garments
3. Children's outer-
wear, fur goods &
miscellaneous 18 640-1404 7 200-471
apparel and
accessories
4. Other 46 756-1757 7 42-87
TOTAL 212 5586-12,868 109 2634-6087
MA:SC:jm
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
-30. 18 Tremont Street. Boston, MA 02108 / (617) 725-3342
E IIC/UIostum
TO: Dan Fishbein
FROM: Mike Adams,4 (
DATE: March 5, 1981
RE: Sites Available for Garment Industry Re-location
A. SOUTH END
1. 464 Harrison Avenue
150,000 SF/Building; 20,000 SF/Open Land
Owner: Davidson Management Company
- Availability: Currently available for lease at
$2.50-$2.75 SF.
2. 500 Harrison Avenue
150,000 SF/Building; 20,000 SF/Open Land
Owner: Davidson Management Company
Availability: Currently available for lease at -
$2.50-$2.75 SF.
3. 433-443 Harrison Avenue and 543 Harrison Avenue
Approximately 4.2 acres separated by underutilized
side street.
Owner: BRA
Availability: Proposals for development will be
considered by the BRA.
B. SOUTH BOSTON
1. BMIP Ent-:ance, 660 Summer Street
190,000 SF/Open Land
Owner: EDIC/Boston
Availability: 60,000 SF are now available in the BMIP. This
can be expanded to 190,000 SF by moving utility lines
and/or acquiring the Army Base.
2. Navy Recreation Site; 500 block Summer Street
100,000 SF/Building; 800,000SF/Open Land
Owner: MassPort
Availability: MassPort has not decided on a use
for this property.
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corooration of Boston
. 18 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108 / (617) 725-3342
.13 .
Dan Fishbein
March 5, 1981
Page 2
3. Commonweatlh Flats, Summer Street
22 Acres open land
Owner: Massport
Availability: Massport plans to make this available
to the fishing industry.
4. Fargo Building, 451 D. Street
131,000 SF building space available
Broker: Codman Company, Exclusive
Availability: 15,000 SF on 3rd floor, 51,000 SF on 4th. floor,
28,000 SF on 5th floor, 47,000 SF on 6th floor,
5. Boston Army Base, 660 Summer Street
2,424,000 SF building space
Owner: U.S. Army
Availability:. Building 114, containing 1,651,200 SF of
space will be conveyed to EDIC in 1 year. Space available
for lease in 2 years. (Time frame too long for most companies)
C. CHARLESTOWN
1. Charlestown Navy Yard, Chelsea Street
Building #114: 80,000 SF
Building #149: 725,000 SF
Buil.ding #199: 550,000 SF
Owner: BRA
Availability: BRA will consider proposals for buildings
Companies interested must form a single development
entity. All three buildings would need some rehabilitation
work.
2. 7 Sherman Street
50,000 SF/Building; 13,000 SF/Open Land
Owner: Barry Goldman
Availability: Presently available for sale at
$175,000. Building has wood frame, aluminum siding.
MA: jm
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
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RESULTS OF THE DOWNTOWN BOSTON APPAREL AND LEATHER COMPANY SURVEY
Hinety-one percent of the respondents to the Economic Development and
industrial Corporation of Boston (EDIC/Boston) apparel and leather industry
survey must relocate. These companies will need over 600,000 square feet of
space.
'The majority of the companies who responded to the survey appear to be
stable businesses. The aggregate- employment level has increased 24 percent from
three years ago and the vast majority of companies indicated that their units of
production and gross sales have increased also.
The survey was done by EDIC/Boston to assess the magnitude and immediacy of
the relocation problem which faces the garment and leather companies of downtown
Boston and to determine the space requirements for a garment center building.
Distributed to 185 companies in-the downtown area, a full 25 percent, or 47
firms responded to the survey. These 47 companies employ 2,356 people which
represents 51 percent of the estimated 4,600 downtown garment workers.
Of the 47 companies answering the survey, 43 firms who employ 2,016 people
indicated that they must relocate. The reasons mentioned most often for having
to move are the conversiQn of buildings to office-space (15 companies) and
medical space (11 companiesl.
Based on the lease expiration dates of the- companies who need to move, the
relocation problem is immediate. Twenty companies, 47 percent of those who need
to relocate, are either tenants-at-will or have leases which expire in 1981.
Another 14 companies have leases that will end in 1982.
The average rent which apparel manufacturers and contractors currently nay
is $2.16 per square foot with a range of $.94 to $4.01. Garment and leather
wholesalers, who usually have smaller spaces than the garment producers, pay an.
average of $3.64 per square foot. The range of rent for wholesalers is much
greater, $1.25 to $10.50, because the quality of space varies significantly.
S$me wholesalers haye mostly warehouse space, while others require only showrooms.
Boston's two largest banks, Shawmut Bank of Boston and First National Bank
of Boston, have the majority of respondents as clients with 21 and 18 firms,
respectiyely.
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
18 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108 / (617) 725-3342VIM.
- * ~ !---31
-2-
The apparel industry, which is quite labor-intensive, employs a large
percentage of minorities. Of the 2,356 people employed by the companies who
responded to the survey, 47 percent are Oriental and another 18 percent rep-
resent other racial minority groups. In addition, 58 percent of the workers
are residents of Boston. A majority of the employees, 57 percent, use mass
transportation. to get to work, while another 21 percent walk.
Nearly all the respondents were interested in locating in a permanent
garment center building. Thirty-seven companies would be willing to con-
tribute S200 - $400 towards hiring consultants to devise a feasibility study,
building scheme and financial plan for such a garment center. A matching.
contribution would be made by public and private institutions.
Although preference with regard to location of a garment center was not
a question on the survey, interest was shown for several suggested options.
Sixteen companies had a specific interest in South Boston at either the Boston
Marine Industrial Park (BMIP) or the Boston Army Base, while five other com-
panies desired to build on property in the South End. Eight wholesale com-
panies were interested in a wholesale trade center which would attract buyers
throughout New England.
Based on detailed building requirements and using a computer program,
several cost estimates were developed for alternative garment center buildings.
The construction of a 400,000 square foot building with 4 freight elevators on
2 floors at the BMIP would cost approximately $32.00 per square foot. This
could accomodate the 16 companies who previously expressed an interest in the
plan. With two additional stories for this building, the cost would be $30.50
per square foot. When portions of the building which can not be used for
production or office space (stairways, elevators, cafeteria) are deducted from
the total building area, construction costs increase to $38.00 per square foot
and $36.00 per square foot respectively. The cost of construction of a
building in the South End would be comparable. Because construction costs
are high there has been increased interest in locating at the Boston Army Base.
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS
Strong response: 47 companies employing 2,356 people
77% of respondents could face eviction/substantial rent
increases within 1 year.
Respondents are stable: 462 employees added in past 3
years. Units of production rising.
58% of employees live in Boston. Most take public
transportation to work.
16 companies expressed strong interest in locating
garment center at BMIP or BAB, 400,000 SF needed.
Undecided companies could increase garment center to
600,000 SF.
2 or 3 story garment center (new construction) would
cost approximately $25.00 - $30.00/SF (final estimate will be
available Thursday).
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
I4A ' C/BITstOIl
Total
Type of Product:
(number of companies)
women's apparel
leather goods
samples
men's apparel
other
Type of Company:
(number of companies)
manufacturers
contractors
wholesaler,garment
wholesaler, leather
other
Bank:
(number of companies)
First National Bank of
Boston
Shawmut National
other
Annual Rent:
manufacturers
contractors
wholesaler, garment
wholesaler, leather
other
All
GARMENT SURVEY RESULTS
PART I
Group
A
Group
B
31
8
2
3
3
'9
21
7
8
2
18
21
8
standard
mean deviation
2.34 .72
l..98 .89
4.0.3 3.60
3.25 2.43
1.53 ---
2.28 1.29
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Deve!opment & Industria! Corporation of Boston
18 Tremont Street, Boston MA 02108/(61 J;7242
Group
C
GARMENT SURVEY RESULTS
PART I
Total Group Group GroupA B C
Do you expect a sub-
stantial rent increase
this year?:
(number of companies)
YES 24
NO 14
other 2
did not answer 7
Expiration date of
current lease:
(number of companies)
tenant at will 21
8/81 to 11/81 2
12/81 to 3/82 4
4/82 to 7/82 8
8/82 to 11/82 2
12/82 to 3/83 3
4/83 to 7/83 2
8/83 to 11/83 0
12/83+ 3
owns building 1
did not answer 1
Do you need to relocate?:
(number of companies)
definitely 29
likely 14
unlikely 1
definitely not -
did not answer 3
GARMENT SURVEY RESULTS
PART I
Total Group Group GroupA B C
Why do you have to
relocate?:
(number of companies)
conversion to housing 3
conversion to officespace 15
conversion to medical 11
space
street reallignment 3
need to 'expand or 6
modernize
rent increase 4
did not answer 4
does not have to relocate 1
but interested in
garment center
Why do you have to
relocate?:
(number of employees)
conversion to housing 147
conversion to officespace 573
conversion to medical 805
space
street reallignment 35
need to expand or 296
modernize
rent increase 160
did not answer 250
does not have to relocate 90
but interested in
garment center
Current number of
employees:
manufacturers 625
contractors 1,546
wholesalers, garment 76
wholesalers, leather 91
other 18
1,205 3202,3'56Total
GARMENT SURVEY RESULTS
PART I
Group Group Group
A .B C
Number of Employees 3
years ago?:
manufacturers 405
contractors 1,340
wholesalers, garment 54
wholesalers, leather 74
other 21
Total 1,894
Ethnicity of Workforce:
(number of employees)
black 144 89 9
hispanic 177 80 34
oriental 1,108 647 231
other minorities 95 87 -
caucasian 819 302 46
did not answer 13 - -
Total 2,356 1,205 320
Workforce Transporta-
tion Needs:
(number of employees)
employees living in 1,362 774 259
Boston
employees using public 1,330 679 66
transportation
employees who walk to 490 183 231
work
Number of Employees
Living in Boston:
manufacturers 277
contractors 1,034
wholesalers, garment 19
wholesalers, leather 20
other 12
Gross Payroll:($)*
manufacturers $ 4,188,500
contractors 12,625,000
wholesalers, garment 125,000
wholesalers, leather 1,327,000
other 500,000
Total $18,765,500 $9,258,500 $2,525,000
*Note: Number of 12
companies not
answering
GARMENT SURVEY RESULTS
PART I
Total GroupA
Production and Sales
In the past 3 years
have your units of pro-
duction changed?:
(number of companies)
increased
decreased
stayed the same
did not answer
In the past 3 years
have your gross sales
changed?:
(number of companies)
increased
decreased
stayed the same
did not answer
Would you consider a
new garment center
building?:
YES
NO
did not answer
Would you prefer to
lease or owh?:
(number of companies)
lease
own
did not answer
Preference to lease
or own
(number of companies/
number of square feet)
lease
own
did not answer
Would you contribute
$200-$400 towards a
consultant?:
YES
NO
did not answer
31
5
5
6
35
2
5
5
43
3
1
12
26
9
12/ 71,900
25/500,500
10/114,500
7/ 48,800
22/420,500
6/ 80,500
2/ 17,000
12/295,500
2/ 23,500
37
8
2
Group
B
Group
C
0/0
5/65,000
Part II Survey Results
Group A: All companies interested in garment center except
wholesalers 35 respondents
Group B: BMIP subgroup 16 respondents
Group C: South End subgroup 5 respondents
Questions:
A. Gross floor area:
B. What percent of A
would be:
1) office
2) warehouse
3) mfg./assembly
4) other
C. "... would space
above first floor
be OK?"
Yes
No
A
558,800
30,275
149,920
369,275
9,330
33
6
B
336,000
17,400
127,500
139,600
1,500
C
65,000
700
0
64,300
0
15
-1
D. "... could some
portion of operation
be above first floor?"
E. If yes to D
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
F. Minimum ceiling height
square feet of floor
space with ceiling
over 12'
1) office
2) warehouse
3) manufacturing
4) other
4,400 s.f.
33,700
33,070
0
0 s.f.
31,000
0
0
G. Length x width
5
0
0 s.f.
0
0
0
A B
H. 1) % of wall
space for
windows
2) # of freight/
shipping doors 51 25 7
3) Estimated size
of doors
4) Hours/day use
of door 75.08 41.75 5
5) # of freight
elevators 38 16 5
6) Size of elevators
7) Weight cap. of
elevators
8) Hours/day use
elevator 67.08 35.25 6
I. Utilities
Heat
1) office 30,275 s.f. 18,150 s.f. 700 s.f.
2) warehouse 136,270 114,900 0
3) manufacturing 365,675 189,600 60,700
4) other 7,550 0 0
Total 539,770 277,650 61,400
A/C
1) office 26,070 17,400 0
2) warehouse 136,270 114,900 0
3) manufacturing 280,150 150,600 39,000
4) other 4,750 0 0
Total 447,240 282,900 39,000
Ventilation
1) office
2) warehouse
3) manufacturing
4) other
5) # of amps
6) steam required:
yes 26 12 5
no 8 4 0
if yes:
volume 160 80
pressure 540 80 90
J. Rest room facilities
1) office
male 42 21 0-
female 77 55 0
2) warehouse
male 82 58 0
female 31 15 0
3) manufacturing 376 212
male 1,588 866 29
female 279
4) other
male 14 10 0
female 38 19 0
2,243 1,25
C
B C
K. "... separate
toilet facilities/
common facilities
acceptable?"
yes
no
L. Parking
1) employees adj. to
prop./all day
2) employees adj. to
entrance/all day
3) visitors entrance/
2 hours
4) visitors entrance/
15 minutes
5) number of trucks
parked overnight
small
medium
large
M. Willing to pay for
parking?
yes.
no
N. Fee for parking
Indoor
range
average
Outdoor
range
average
189
49
53
35
326
0
1
0
29
4
$25-60/mo.
$46.40/mo.
$20-50/mo.
$34.70/mo.
100
13
21
14
1~4
0
1
0
13
2
$30-65/mo.
$52.60/mo.
$20-50/mo.
$34.70/mo.
18
0
0
6
lli
0
0
0
5
0
$60/mo.
$60/mo.
$30/mo.
$30/mo.
A
B C
K. "... separate
toilet facilities/
common facilities
acceptable?"
yes
no
L. Parking
1) employees adj. to
prop./all day
2) employees adj. to
entrance/all day
3) visitors entrance/
2 hours
4) visitors entrance/
15 minutes
5) number of trucks
parked overnight
small
medium
large
M. Willing to pay for
parking?
yes
no
N. Fee for parking
Indoor
range
average
Outdoor
range
average
$25-60/mo.
$46.40/mo.
$20-50/mo.
$34.70/mo.
$30-65/mo.
$52. 60/mo.
$20-50/mo.
$34.70/mo.
100
13
21
18
0
0
6
aI
189
49
53
35
0
1
0
29
4
14
148
0
1
0
0
0
0
5
0
.13
2
$60/mo.
$60/mo.
$30/mo.
$30/mo.
A
GARMENT INDUSTRY RELOCATION ASSOCIATION NEWS
Published by the Economic Development
and Industrial Corporation of Boston
September 29, 1981
GARMENT INDUSTRY RELOCATION ASSOCIATION FORMED
The garment companies located in the Chinatown vicinity have formed an
association which will be the driving force behind the relocation of the downtown
apparel industry.
The first meeting of the Association, held on September 17 at the Quincy
Community School, was attended by 21 company owners and representatives from the
First National Bank of Boston, the Shawmut National Bank, the International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), the Mayor's Office, the Economic Development and
Industrial Corporation of Boston (EDIC/Boston), the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA), the Boston Committee, the Chinatown Housing and Land Development Task Force,
Cofngressional staff members and trade associations. The Association's goal is to
make space available for member companies at the Boston Army Base as soon as
possible and at an affordable cost.
The Associations' first task will be to hire a consultant to represent the
industry during its relocation efforts. The consultant will also provide technical
assistance to member companies for financial packaging, cost estimates and advice
on development. Each member of the Association has contributed $400.00 towards
the consultant's fees.
Tufts New England Medical Center (T-NEMC) Executive Director Edward Ehrlich
has agreed to match the $400,00 contributions with up to $10,000. Many Association
embers are T-NEMC tenants at the 15 and 35 Kneeland Street buildings, which are
operated by T-NEMC.
The Association meeting included a report by the EDIC/Boston on the progress
being made towards obtaining the Boston Army Case. A $75,000 grant has recently been
obtained by EDIC in order to determine what utility and building improvements will
be needed at the Base. EDIC's top priority is to allocate space in the 1,600,000
square foot Boston Army Base to Association members.
Rents in the building will be based on its acquisition costs, improvement
costs and operating expenses for heat and maintenance. While building renovation
costs will be known in early November, EDIC/Boston is urging federal authorities
to determine the building sale price by the end of the year. The Association
consultant will work to speed up this process.
An Executive Committee for the Garment Industry Relocation Association was
selected at the September 17th meeting. The Committee will meet bi-weekly to hear
reports from the consultant, and determine what needs to be done to move the
project forward. All decisions of the Committee will be subject to the approval
of a majority of Association members. All Association members will hold monthly
EDIC/BOSTON 18 TREMONT ST BOSTON MA. 02108 617-725-3342
MARIO SPORTSWEAR LEASE FOR FARGO BUILDING NEARING COMPLETION
It is anticipated that Mario Sportswear Company, Inc. will finalize leasing
arrangements with the Codman Company for approximately 24,000 SF of space in the
Fargo Building within the next few days. Mario Sportswear Treasurer, Salvatore
Lo Porto, was informed about the availability of space in the Fargo Building,
located at 451 D Street near the Boston Army Base, during a meeting at the EDIC/
Boston office on January 10.
Mario is currently located at 10 Thatcher Street in the North End. The new
building owner plans to convert the facility to residential condominiums. EDIC/
Boston, Mario's Attorney, and the BRA worked with the building owner to give Mario
three months of additional time to relocate. The space to be leased in the Fargo
Building could not have been readied for Mario, if this time extension had not
been obtained.
EDIC/BOSTON 18 TREMONT ST. BOSTON MA. 02108 617-725-3342
meetings. Committee and membership meetings will be co-chaired by a garment
company owner (to be selected), Ronald Alman, New England Regional Director of
the ILGWU, and Brian F. Dacey, Director, EDIC/Boston.
Members of the Executive Committee are:
Murton Sudalter
owner
Victor Bias Binding Company
Dexter Fields
owner
Cricket Sportswear, Inc.
Ronald Alman
New England Regional Director
ILGWU
Brian F. Dacey
Cirectnr
EDIC/Boston
Robert Ryan
Deputy Mayor
Director, BRA
David Lavien
Legal Counsel
Contractor's Association
Joseph Tansey
Assistant Vice President
First National Bank of Boston
Lester Geist
owner
Herman Geist, Inc.
Selma Gottlieb
Executive Director
Apparel Manufacturers Association
Jay Fialkow
Attorney
Apparel Manufacturers Association
U.S. Senator Paul E. Tsongas
U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy
U.S. Representative John J. Moakley
Glen Hutliff
Chinatown Housing and Land
Development Task Force
A.V. O'Hanley
Vice President
Shawmut National Bank
Frank Jones
President
The Boston Committee
Additional Committee members can be chosen by majority vote of the Association
members. The first Committee meeting will be held on October 2 at 10:00 AM at the
office of the ILGWU. At that time, Committee members will interview a proposed
Association consultant. Committee members will also review the Association by-laws.
FUTURE NEWSLETTERS WILL BE MAILED TO ASSOCIATION MEMBERS
All companies who
the Association. This
the consultant's fee.
tactMurton Sudalter at
426-6391.
wish to be a part of the Garment Industry Center should join
involves the contribution of $400,00 which will be used for
Those companies who would like to become members should con-
426-1363, Lester Geist at 426-7237, or Dexter Fields at
In the future, newsletters and other written communications will only be sent
to companies who have joined the Association.
EDIC/BOSTON 18 TREMONT ST BOSTON MA. 02108 617-725-3342
TIlE BOSTON GLOBE TUESDAY. FEBRUARY 16, 1982 21
Officials
By Joan Vennochi
Globe Staff
The 12-acre complex that makes up the
Tufts-New England Medical Center is close
to the heart of Boston's Chinatown. The
boundary lines that gave the territory ex-
clusively to Tqfts were drawn more than
15 years ago; a tug-of-war between the.
needs of the Chinese community and the
expansion desires of the institution has
continued since then.
Today, for the first time since the ur-
ban renewal years. Boston city officials
have stepped in to give official support to
Chinatown. The city's actions come in the
face of recent expansion efforts by the
Medical Center that the city says threaten
jobs and Industry in Boston.
"Tufts Is making private decisions that
have tremendous implications for the rest
of the city," Robert L. Ryan, the director of
the Boston Redevelopment Authority,
take a stand for Ch
(BRA), said in a recent interview. "We spillover into two buildings In China-
have taken a stand." -town's garment. district, and a recently
The official population in Chinatown is publicized plan to build a iedical library,
about 7500, but officials estimate that the 'Ryan said that the city is increasing the
number of illegal aliens may double the scrutiny given to the medical center's de-.
population. As the population has grown, velopment plans 'and its impact on the:
tight living quarters and job shortages surrounding community. -
have intensified the conflict over the medi-' The garment district buildings at 15 1,
cal center's continued expansion. and 35 Kneeland st., which the medical.'
Today, Chinatown's viability as a' center leased last February with an option
neghborhood, not a mere commercial dis- to buy, house 11 apparel companies and
trict, is threatened by a combination of about 600 garment workers.
private and commercial development In Since last spring, the city's Economic
and aound the community, city officials Development and Industrial Commission
and Chinatown spokesmen say. has been working with the apparel com-pany owners on a plan to relocate to South
BRA officials helped draw the bound- Boston.
ary lines for Tufts in the mid-1960s. Ever 'City officials fear that if the workers
since then, one BRA official now says. the and companies in the Kneeland street
belief that the BRA and Tufts "have been buildings are forced out of Boston, the gar-
in bed together" has prevailed in China- ment industry will collapse.
town and elsewhere in the city. "That's not Just a Chinatown or Tufts'
But now, in the aftermath of Tufts' consideration," said Ryan. "That's a busi-
inatown
ness consideration, an economic consider-
ation."
In Chinatown, where the issue of the
medical center's expansion has surfaced
with renewed intensity over the past year,
some community leaders say that time
has come for the community to negotiate
more strongly, and to use city politics for:
more effective leverage in its dealings with
the Medical Center.
."Tufts got most of what it wanted in
the past, because no one said anything,"
said William Chin, the president of the
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Assn.. in
a' recent interview. "We (in Chinatown]
don't want the moon; we Jqst want them
to recognize the needs of the Chinese com-
munity."
Medical center officials insist that the
institution has been a "go; neighbor" to
Chinatown over the years. As examples,
they cite assistance they have provided in
CHINATOWN. Page 22
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Officials take a stand for Chinatown
* CHINATOWN officials havetaken these steps!
Continued from Page 21 - 0 The directors of two city agen-
cies - the BRA and the Economict'he planning and development DvlpetadIdsra o-
of a helhceneadcom it Development and Industrial Corn
ty mission - wrote separate letters
school In Chinatown, as well as the last Octoter to medical center offi-
nearly $1 million they have con- cist 'eriticizing the medical cen-
1 tributed to the health center's oper- lte's plans to raise rents and even-
ational budget. - tually evict tenants at 15 and 35
dward C. Ehrlich, the melical Knelan st
center's chief administrative offi- Kneeland st.
cer, says that politics isat the root The BRA letter charged that the
of the city's recent criticisms of the Medical -Center" was violating its
institution's plans. "-6-year-old cooperation agreement
I attribute that [criticism] to with the city, and threatened to
beiuig politically responsive. I don't ithhold approval for future devel-
think they could act in any other opment plans. -
faghion," he says. I In the. cooperation agreement. EDWARD C. EHRLICH
To those charges. Ryan says: the medical cehter agreed to "facili Sees politics in city st
"We are a political body. The may- tate efficient use of land in the area
or 'is the public trustee for the for housing, commercial and insti- commission'requested
neighborhoods. Our responsibility tutional use" and to "preserve and ummon creases i
is to the public." strengthen the residential charac- um on rent incree
As a result of new concerns over ter of the area in such a way as to relocate the garmenti
the impact of the medical center's promote and insure its future." South Boston, and said
most recent expansion plans, city The Economic Development Sou th t and sgrettable" thathme
- k
ance
i morator-'t
id evictionsj
nt plans to
ndustry in
it was "re-
dical center
had gone ahead with earlier rent
increases without informing city
officials.
0 Acting on the recommenda-'
tion of the BRA, with support from
the Chinese community, the city's
Zoning Board of Appeals last Octo-
ber changed the procedure that a
hospital must follow to win approv-'
al for expansion for medical use.
The procedure, designed to impose
tighter controls on institutional ex-
pansion throughout Boston, re-
quires an independent review and
recommendation for approval from
the BRA before the Zoning Board of
Appeals can approve a variance al-
lowing medical use for a building
lot.
Betore the amendment, approv-
al for such medical expansion was
automatic. BRA officials said that
their support for the amendment
was triggered by the controversy
,over 15 and 35 Kneeland st. The
*medical center's plans for those
two buildings must now be re-
viewed by the BRA, and approval
.won from the Zoning Board of Ap-
peals.
1 City officials say that they
.want to be kept better informed of
plans for institutional growth, not
only in Chinatown, but throughout
Boston. This position is related to
the extent of tax-exempt property
in Boston and the impact from ex-
pansion of tax-exempt institutions
on Boston's tax base, at a time
when the city is facing serious fis-
cal problems.
The medical center, for exam-
ple, now makes an annual pay-
ment in lieu of taxes under pn
agreement signed with the city in
1979.-The payment, which is based
in part on the number of Boston
residents employed by the Medical
Center, totalled $89,033 last year.
- The impact of the city's tougher
!stance is still uncertain.
For now, the medical center has.
put its plans for Kneeland street on
.hold as it. awaits the findings of a
consultant's report, for which it
donated $10,000, on a proposal to
relocate the entire garment ind4s-
try to South.Boston. But Tufts' offi-
cials say that they will not "throw
any tenants out into the cold."
. The move to acquire the Kn~e-
land street buildings marks the
first time that the medical center
has looked to property in China-
town beyond the physical bound-
aries of the master plan that !it
worked out with the BRA during
the urban renewal years.
. Medical center officials interpret
the agreement .to mean that they
are not restricted to the literal
boundaries of the master plan. .
Ryan agrees that Tufts did not
violate "the letter of law" by ac-
quiring property beyond the mas-
ter plan, but says the center's "uni-.
lateral action violated the goal of
the cooperation'agreement."
In Chinatown, community lead-,
ers say that the neighborhood has
already lost substantial ground to
Tufts' expansion, and they foresee,
a continugg battle ahead. . 1
-"Maybe I'm wrong." -said Chin ..
of the Chinese Consolidated Bene-,,
volent Assn.. "but I really don't see .
any benefit to Chinatown. The'
medical center keeps on expand-.
Ing: they keep buying our property.
The minuses outweigh the pluses.",
Ronald Yee, the executive direc-
tor of the South Cove YMCA and a.
member of the medical center's
,Board of Trustees, says a commu-
nity failure to maintain open chan-,
nels of communication with Tufts.
over the years has resulted in Chin-
atown's getting less than It feels it
deserves in employment outreach.
and housing assistance.
"I am sure that given the right
circumstances, the right type of
dinner meetings with the Medical
Center and the community, serious,
negotiations could begin for the.,
mutual benefit of all of us," says
Yee.
In the meantime, Ehrlich of the
medical center said that city offi-
cials have been exerting "tremen-
dous" pressure in the effort to force'
changes in the institution's devel-
opment plans.
Ryan does not deny it. He said
that the city expects Tufts to "ad-.
vise us of the implications of all
their actions."
BRA officials have said that.,
they were again thrown off balance
last December when they learned
from a newspaper article, rather
than from Tufts, of the Medical
Center's plaqs to build a medical It-
krary with ai5 million federal
grant.
To Ehrlich," this is another mis-
understanding between the Medi-
Cal Center and city officials. He
said the city has known since ur-
ban renewal -days that a library
was in the offing. Ehrlich says that'
even if he were to change places
with a Chinatown resident: "I
could not see the negative effects [of
the medical center's presence]." He
says that the medical center has
made concessions, such as giving
up land allotted to it under urban
renewal, in the interests of
strengthening the Chinese commu-
nity,
Ryan said he believes that the
united stand taken over the past
year by Chinatown and by city offi-
cials has made Tufts "slow down
and pause and take a look at the
implications of their actions."
For now, he said, he is satisfied
that Tufts "recognizes their par-
ticipation and effect on industry on.
the city is measurable, and that
our (the BRA's) involvement is not
to Interfere but to preserve."
As for Tufts' future compliance
with its cooperation agreement
with the city. Ryan says: "I'll let
you know when I find out more
about their library."
transportation and childcare needs, require affirmative
assistance in order to relocate to jobs outside Chinatown;
WHEREAS, the Chinese community seeks to insure the
continuing economic viability of its neighborhood, and to
strengthen its residential character in such a way as to
achieve neighborhood stability and promote future growth that
is consistent with community needs for housing, employment, and
human services;
WHEREas, the City of Boston seeks to strengthen and expand
its real property tax base, to preserve the viability of the
garment industry in Boston, and to facilitate efficient land
use in Chinatown, South Cove and the Central Business area for
housing, commercial and institutional use;
WHEREAS, all parties involved desire to demonstrate that
complex issues and differences can be resolved through a spirit
of mutual cooperation and good faith commitment to work
together;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto mutually agree as
follows:
1. The Medical Center agrees to observe a moratorium on
any evictions, except for just cause, of the present tenants of
15 and 35 Kneeland Street for a period of three years dating
from the signing of this Agreement, or until a satisfactory
development project can be designed and fully implemented.
2. During the moratorium, the Medical Center agrees in
good faith to maintain rents at levels which are reasonably
based on the actual operating cost of the buildings and the
tenants' ability to pay.
3. The Medical Center agrees to fully cooperate with all
parties in the planning and implementation of a viable
development project that is satisfactory to the industry, the
garment workers, the Chinese community and the City. The
Medical Center agrees to negotiate a fair displacement
compensation settlement with the tenants for the purpose of
assisting them in relocation.
4. The Medical Center agrees to cooperate with the City,
the Union and the Chinese community in developing plans for the
retraining and employment of garment workers displaced directly
or indirectly as, a result of the relocation of the industry
from 15 and 35 Kneeland Street.
5. The City, through the offices of the Economic
Development and Industrial Corporation or any other appropriate
agency, agrees to continue its efforts to stabilize the garment
industry within the City of Boston. The City shall coordinate
the combined efforts of the parties to this Agreement to
develop and implement a viable development project. The City
agrees to use its best efforts to explore and obtain suitable
finance and taxation packages to assist the industry.
6. The City agrees to convene a committee of
representatives from the Medical Center, the Chinese community,
the Union and the Industry to monitor the progress of the
development project.
7. The City agrees, through the Boston Redevelopment
Authority or any other appropriate agency, to initiate a
process that brings together representatives of the Medical
Center and all sectors of the Chinese community in ongoing
discussions regarding the Medical Center's Masterplan, as well
as any developments in the Chinatown/South Cove neighborhoods.
The purpose of these discussions is to generate a planning
process that would involve the City, the Medical Center and the
entire Chinese community in order to facilitate land use in
Chinatown and South Cove.
8. The Industry agrees to work with the various parties
in planning and implementing a development project.
9. The Union agrees to cooperate with all parties in
carrying out the terms of this Agreement and the workforce, and
by keeping its members informed of the progress of the
development project.
10. The Chinese community agrees to cooperate and assist
in the design and implementation of the development plan, to
inform the community-at-large of its progress, and to assist in
monitoring its progress and the terms of this Agreement.
6ston Army Base;
rare Feet for Lease
Thirty-five garment companies will be moving to
the South Boston Army Base next summer. They
will fill nearly half of one of the largest industrial
buildings in the metropolitan area- Building 114.
EDIC's development of the 1.6 million square foot
complex is underway. A federal grant is in place,
and engineering work has begun. Two hundred
thousand square feet of commercial and industrial
space is still available for lease and EDIC is sign-
ing tenants now for 1983 occupancy.
The first phase of development at Building 114 in-
cludes a garment center. That is welcome news
for the City's second largest industry, which has
been threatened by office and condominium de-
velopment in Chinatown. The center will save
thousands of jobs and keep the City's largest ap-
parel firms from leaving town.
u ] 111111
An Industrial Renaissance. On October 1,
Boston Mayor Kevin H. White announced a $3.7
million Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG)-
from HUD for the creation of the garment center.
U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts
Senate President William Bulger and 100 business.
banking and community representatives joined the
Mayor in making the announcement. Both Mayor
White and Senator Kennedy acknowledged the
extraordinary contribution of U.S. Representative
John Joseph Moakley in helping the project suc-
ceed. U.S. House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
and U.S. Senator Paul E. Tsongas were also
credited for their work.
Mayor White called the garment center a
"renaissance" for the City's apparel industry. He
said the project is an excellent example of the
public-private partnership that is serving the
neighborhoods of Boston so well."
"The garment industry has a proud history in
Boston," said Senator Kennedy. The Senator used
the opportunity to support the UDAG program and
to voice his opposition to Reagan administration
proposals to cut funding for it. "Projects like the
garment center are proof of the value of the UDAG
program," he said.
Innovative Financing. The UDAG is just a part of
the $14.7 million financial package which EDIC
has assembled for the development of the gar-
ment center.
The largest portion of the money will come from a
HUD Section 108 loan an~d a $4.5 million industrial
revenue bond backed by State Street Bank and
Shawmut Bank. "Both banks have been extremely
supportive of this project," said EDIC Director
Brian Dacey. "William Edgerlv, the President and
Chairman of Street Ban and John LaWare.
the hairman of Shawmut ank are clearly com-
mitted to manufacturing growth in the City."
Several million dollars in private investment and a
loan from the Massachusetts Government Land
Bank will also help finance the project. Garment
companies moving into the Army Base have com-
mitted a total of one million dollars for their own
building improvements, and a Massachusetts
Public Works grant of $600.000 will pay for road
repairs.
Building Sale Difficult. Without a doubt. the
most difficult aspect of the garment center project
was negotiating the sale of the Army Base with the
U.S. General Services Administration. The GSA
had appraised the property at $4.1 million. EDIC's
independent appraisal put the value at $1.5
million, and the final price was $3.5 million. "We
were facing extraordinary timing pressures." said
Dacey. "The garment companies have to move
from their present locations by next summer. The
financing had to be in place so we could start
renovations in January. and have the building
ready in time for the companies to move in.
However, HUD had said that it would not even
consider our grant application until a sale agree-
ment was reached. We had less than two months
to make a deal."
(Continued on page 5)
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We've got
space.
TM MOUTON AMdIVRAE
666SummerStreet
200,000 Square Feet - Renovated
Commercial and Industrial Uses
Renovations Inciude.:
-New utiliies
12 newpasseng and freight elevators
Off-street truck i&oading
Convenient wateriront location
24-tour security
Long-tetrm leases
Rents star? at 275/SF including taxes.
Now leasing for 1683
Catl Jane Donnelly 6171 725-3342
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The Boston Army Base:
Putting It All Together
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Top left.
Last March, Chinatown garment
workers toured the Army Base for
the first time. Months before, Urban
Consulting Associates, Inc. sur-
veyed workers on their day care and
transportation needs. Company
owners were also questioned about
space requirements and electrical
demands.
Above:
In July, the Boston City Council ap-
proved EDIC's application for an Ur-
ban Development Action Grant
(UDAG) for the garment center.
Councillors Bruce Bolling (left),
Chairman of the Committee for Plan-
ning and Development and Ter-
rence McDermott (right) heard
testimony from Chinatown and
South Boston community groups,
Massport, the International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union, company
owners, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority and the U.S. Congres-
sional delegation.
Right:
U.S. Representative John Joseph
Moakley hasbeen vital to the gar-
ment center project since its incep-
tion more than a year ago. Here, in
his Washingtonoffice, Moakley
meets withMarilyn Swartz Lloyd,
EDIC Directw of Ma 'k(g and
Developrpnti-hd Droly fftberich,
EDIC Projeci~fanager for the Army
Base. . . "
Above right:
On October 1, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development
awarded EDIC a $3.7 million UDAG.
The grant is part of a $14.7 million
financial package needed to buy
and develop the Army Base.
On the day of the grant announce-
ment, U.S. Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy spoke about the "long and
proud history of Boston's garment
industry, and congratulated the City
on its plan to keep the industry here.
Above:
Massachusetts Transportation
Secretary James Carlin (center) and
State Senate President William
Bulger sign a $600,000 Public
Works Grant for road repairs at the
Army Base. At left is State
Representative Michael Flaherty.
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(Continued from page 1)
"These were exhaustive negotiations," he con-
tinued. "There were times when the temptation to
walk away was overwhelming. But we were so
committed to this project that the thought of aban-
doning it, after we'd come so far, was virtually
unthinkable."
Community Supports Project. This summer, the
Boston community got a chance to voice its opin-
ions dn the garment center during public hearings
in Chinatown and before the City Council.
Chinatown community representatives support the
project, but they do worry about the overall effect
it will have on workers. Many have lived and
worked in the Chinatown community all their lives,
and a move to the Army Base won't be easy.
The Army Base is only a half mile from Chinatown,
but transportation is a big concern. EDIC is work-
ing with the MBTA to provide more bus service to
the Base, and garment companies are consider-
ing a shuttle bus for employees.
Top:
Boston Mayor Kevin H. White talks
to reporters following the UDAG an-
nouncement. Mayor White called
the new garment center a "renais-
sance for the City's apparel
industry.
Above:
EDIC Director Brian F. Dacey thanks
business, banking and community
representatives for their help in ob-
taining the UDAG. Behind Dacey
are Frank Bronstein (far left), Chair-
man of the EDIC Board of Directors
and State Representative James
Brett.
Right:
After the grant announcement,
EDIC's Mary Murphy, Dan Fishbein
and Joe Valle celebrate at the China
Pearl restaurant with project par-
ticipants. The China Pearl's owner is
Bill Chin, President of the Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Associa-
tion, a group which has been very
active in the development of the
garment center. Fishbein coor-
dinated the garment companies
throughout the project.
Pnoto oy rian smith
"The Army Base is the best thing that has ever
happened to Boston's garment industry," said
Allen Couris, President of Flair of Boston. "Now
we'll have a permanent home, where we won't
have to worry about being squeezed out by com-
mercial development and high rents. I, for one, am
going to be a tenant."
Landlords Cooperate. The New England
Medical Center has always played a critical role in
the development of the garment center. New
England Medical owns two Chinatown buildings,
15 and 35 Kneeland Street, which house many of
the City's largest apparel firms. The medical center
had planned to convert the buildings to much
needed office and medical space more than a
year ago, but delayed its project until plans for the
Army Base were completed.
Other landlords in the Chinatown area haven't
been as supportive. More than 50 companies are
threatened with drastic rent increases or evictions;
seven firms have already been forced to leave the
city.
Renovations Begin. The target date for the
opening of Building 114 and the garment center is
the summer of 1983. Before then, much work will
be done.
EDIC will spend more than $13 million to improve
the building. Renovations include a new electrical
system and 12 new passenger and freight eleva-
tors. Although the actual construction won't begin
until January, the engineering firm of Sverdrup &
Parcel and Associates, Inc. has begun drawing up
plans. Wallace, Floyd, Associates, Inc. are the
architects.
"The Boston Army Base could become the Quincy
Market of industrial parks,"-said Marilyn Swartz
Lloyd, Director of Marketing and Development for
EDIC. "The waterfront location is beautiful and full
of activity, and the building has an exciting range
of development possibilities."
Companies interested in leasing space at the Ar-
my Base should call Jane Donnelly at EDIC, (617)
725-3342.
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APPENDIX II
Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston
18 Tremont St./Suite 300/Boston, MA 02108/617 725-3342
REASONS WHY ALTERNATIVE BOSTON LOCATIONS TO THE ARMY BASE ARE NOT FEASIBLE
FOR THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
Many potential new locations for Boston garment companies have been identified
by EDIC. However, the Boston Army Base has been the only feasible location for
nearly all the companies requesting assistance.
Lists of 18 sites most likely to be suited to garment industry needs were prepared
and distributed to companies requesting assistance in February, 1981. The lists
were updated and redistributed three times. The sites on the lists are mainly
multi-tenant industrial buildings with market rate rents or below.
The major concerns of the companies in selecting a new location have been:
*Accessibility of the sites to the- existing mainly Asian workforce.
(Most companies would only consider the neighborhoods closest to
Chinatown: the South End, South Boston, and Charlestown. Some
expressed interest in Allston/Brighton which has a large Asian
community).
*Costs associated with rent, acquisition or development.
*Condition, lay-out, and utility services offered (companies wanted
large, open areas, high electrical service, good elevator service).
*Proximity to other garment companies (many of the companies buy
and sell goods from/to each other. Both workers and owners place
an unusually high premium on the social interaction which has
resulted from close proximity).
*Worker safety: most employees are women and their safety walking to
and from work has been of great concern.
*Availability of the new location on a long-term basis (many company
presidents will pass ownership on to their sons).
Sites were selected for the lists which most nearly satisfied these concerns. A copy
of the February, 1981 list of sites for the garment industry and the updated December,
1981 list which contained some newly identified sites are attached. The reasons why
each location proved unfeasible are listed below:
FEBRUARY, 1981
SOUTH END
1. 464 Harrison Avenue
Building is divided into 5,000 SF bays which are not large enough for most
companies. Building not well maintained and area is unsafe as many alcoholics
stand or sleep on surrounding sidewalks. (The Pine Street Inn, a home for
alcoholics is 1 block away).
Kevin H. White, Mayor
0
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2. 500 Harrison Avenue
Building is divided into 5,000 SF bays which is not large enough for most
companies. Building not well maintained and area is unsafe as many alcoholics
stand or sleep on surrounding sidewalks. (The Pine Street Inn, a home for
alcoholics is 1 block away).
3. 421-422 Harrison Avenue
EDIC helped some of the companies investigate the cost of new construction
on this site. This option proved too costly.
4. Relief Printing
Only enough room available for 1 or 2 companies. Home for alcoholics is
nearby.
5. China Fair
Building is in disrepair; high crime area.
6. Neptune Garment Building
Space available limited and served by one small elevator with no off-street
loading. Company owners could not agree on terms with building owner.
7. 560 Harrison Avenue
Near a high crime area, and the rent was initially too high for most companies.
SOUTH BOSTON
1. BMIP Storage Area
EDIC hired an architect and obtained cost estimates for the construction of
a new garment center on this site. The land area was not large enough for
all the relocating companies to be on one floor. Adding floors necessitates
extensive foundation work due to the poor condition of the soil. This option
proved too costly.
2. Fargo Building
Building is in disrepair and long-term leases are not available. However,
two companies, one of whom was being evicted, did move to this building for
the short run.
3. Boston Army Base
Being considered; project depends on UDAG financing.
4. Milin Realty
Building needs substantial improvement and is distant from Chinatown without
public transportation on the adjacent street.
5. Davidson Property
Distant from Chinatown without public transportation on the adjacent street.
6. EVR Realty Property
Too distant and has no public transportation in immediate area. Space not
available on a leased basis.
7. Stop and Shop
A group of companies considered purchasing this building, but another company
bought it before an offer could be made.
18 Tremont St./Suite 300/Boston, MA 02108/617 725-3342
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CHARLESTOWN
1. Navy Yard
Project requires a developer with substantial experience to prepare a proposal
for the Boston Redevelopment Authority and rehabilitate a building. Many
companies did not want to move to Charlestown.
2. MBTA Property
Same construction cost problem as BMIP Storage Area.
3. Terminal Street
Project requires substantial building rehabilitation and possibly demolition
and new construction. Costs would be at least comparable to new construction.
Public transportation not available on adjacent street.
4. Hoosac Pier
Massport sold this pier to an office building developer.
DECEMBER, 1981
SOUTH END
1. Fidelity Building
Building needs substantial rehabilitation and could only house 1-2 companies.
It is also near the Pine Street Inn.-
SOUTH BOSTON
1. BMIP Entrance
Construction cost problem same as BMIP Storage Area.
NEWMARKET
1. Mr. Boston Building
Too distant from Chinatown.
ALLSTON
1. Mercedes Benz Garage
Only limited space available. Rent higher than most Boston sites.
2. Guardian Building
Cost is high for most companies, and space is available for only 1 company.
18 Tremont St./Suite 300/Boston, MA 02108/617 725-3342
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BOSTON GARMENT DISTRICT PROJECT
COST ESTIMATES FOR NEW BUILDING CONSTRUCTION
The Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston (EDIC/Boston)
with the assistance of Arnold A. Jacobsen and Associates has developed schematic
designs for several garment center building alternatives using the survey data
pertaining to company space requirements. Computer tabulated estimates of con-
struction costs were obtained for these designs. The attached information shows
the results of this work.
Eight different building designs were investigated, as cost estimates were
obtained for concrete block wall construction and metal exterior wall construction
for four alternative buildings. On the attached sheet, the building options listed
as A and B could accomodate 16 companies who showed a strong interest in the
Boston Marine Industrial Park (BMIP). Options C and D are alternatives that could
handle 30 companies who were interested in a garment center building. To maximize
the economies of scale another floor was added to the building design in Options
E and F. Five companies who were interested in a South End location were considered
in developing Options G and H.
Soil borings done at the proposed site at the BMIP indicated a need for founda-
tion pilings. This explains the high estimated foundation cost for the proposed
BMIP alternatives, Although boring tests were not undertaken in the South End, it
is likely that soil conditions resemble those at the BMIP.
On the basis of the survey results, several assumptions were made in developing
these building options. The interior walls of the factory and warehouse space
were left in an unfinished condition. Any office space had a hung ceiling and air
conditioning (no other space had air conditioning). It was estimated that 25 per
cent of the wall space contained windows. Ceiling heights of 12' were provided
for except in a 50,000 S.F. section of the BMIP building where 20' heights were
provided for the benefit of leather goods wholesalers. All buildings were insulated.
The cost of the building could be lowered by reducing the number of windows,
bathrooms, elevators, or loading docks. Air conditioned production space, panelling,
or private bathrooms would increase the cost. A conceptual view of a proposedbui ding at the BMIP is attached.
Using financing options available through EDIC/Boston, the amortized cost of
the building with heat and maintenance costs would be approximately $5.90 per S.F.
annually excluding taxes and ground rent. These options include industrial revenue
bond financing at 13.5% interest, targeted revolving loan fund financing at 10.5%
interest and a Community Development Block Grant used as a loan with no interest
required. A detailed explanation of how this cost was tabulated is also attached.
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
18 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108 / (617) 725-3342
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ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST OF NEWLY CONSTRUCTED
GARMENT CENTER AT BOSTON MARINE INDUSTRIAL PARK
Option B
Total building construction cost:
Revenue generated by 6,000 SF cafeteria:
Building cost less rental revenue:
$12,704,000
36,000
$12,668,000
Financing
- Industrial
Cost PE
Revenue Bond Amount:
Term:
Interest:
Annual payment:
r SF leasable space:
- Targeted Revolving Loan Fund Amount:
Term:
Interest:
Annual payment:
Cost per SF leasable space:
- Community Development Block Grant
Amount:
Term:
Interest:
Annual payment:
Cost per SF leasable space:
Estimated maintenance and heating cost per
SF of leasable space
$11,068,000
20 years
13.5%
$1,609,323
$4.79
$600,000
20 years
10.5%
$71,883
$ .21
~ $1,000,000
20 years
0%
$50,000
$.15
$.75
Total annual cost per leasable SF $5.90
Kevin H. White, Mayor/Economic Development & Industrial Corporation of Boston
*~."" l.18 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108 / (617) 725-3342
BOSTON GARMENT DISTRICT PROJECT
COST ESTIMATES FOR NEW BUILDING CONSTRUCTION
AREA IN $ C ST /SF
1 000 SF GENERAL ELEVATOR BUILDING COSTS IN GROSS NET LEASABLE
OPTION NET GROSS DESCRIPTION F P $ THOUSANDS AREA .- SPACE
BMIP-A 336 400 Two story steel frame 4 - 11,870 building 35.41 42.16
16 w/concrete block walls 45 site prep.
companies 2,250 foundation
14,165
BMIP-B 336 400 Two story pre-engineered 4 - 10,410 31.76 37.81
16 frame w/metal exterior 45
companies walls ?,250
12,705
BMIP-C 483 575 Three story steel frame 4 2 17,080 34.40 40.96
30 w/concrete block walls 45
companies 2,250
19,785
BMIP-D 483 575 Three story pre-
30 engineered frame w/metal 4 2 16,142 32.06 38.17companies exterior walls 45
2,250
18,437
BMIP-E 630 750 Four story steel frame 6 4 24,485 35.7 42.5
additional w/concrete block walls 45
floor 2.250
26.780
BMIP-F 630 750 Four story pre- 6 4 20,574 30.5 36.3
engineered frame w/metal 45
exterior walls 2, 250
22,869
PREPARED BY:
Arnold A. Jacobson
for EDIC/Boston
and Associates
